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To my wife

Preface

The present study is an expansion of a doctoral dissertation
written for the Department of History at the University of Nebraska. It is based upon research conducted in 1953-1954 while
the author was a student at the University of Munich under the
Fulbright program. It treats election systems as instruments of
power, as indicators through their uses and justifications of prevailing social and political conditions and attitudes. It attempts
in this manner to reveal from a specialized study of proportional
representation during the Second Reich something of the nature
of the Weimar heritage.
While aware of his own responsibility for whatever errors the
study may contain, the author acknowledges the many contributions, both direct and indirect, of his professors in the Department
of History. He is especially indebted to Edgar N. Johnson for an
approach to history which emphasizes the goodness and the rationality of man, and to Glenn W. Gray for his method of patient and
painstaking search for the truth. His thanks also go to Robert L.
Koehl for giving so generously of his time in reading and criticizing
the manuscript. To Eugene N. Anderson, now of the University
of California, Los Angeles, the author expresses his deep appreciation for the friendly interest with which he directed the research
and the writing. Whatever may be the merit of the study as an
interpretation of German society and politics stems largely from the
stimulus of his ideas.
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So profound has been the influence of the Fulbright year abroad
upon the author that he should like to acknowledge his indebtedness
to those in this country and in Germany who administer the program, and to the people of the United States and their elected
representatives in Congress who have so wisely begun and continued
this experiment in international understanding.
To the Studies Committee of the University the author extends his thanks for making possible this publication. To the
person, finally, who has contributed beyond measure to his life
and to his work this study is affectionately dedicated.
Carroll College
Waukesha, Wisconsin
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Introduction

Surprisingly little has been written in critical analysis of German
election systems. Herman Finer, Sigmund Neumann, and Carl
Friedrich, among others, have dealt for the most part with political
parties. James Pollock has written descriptions of election machinery and procedures. Ferdinand Hermens has produced the
standard work on proportional representation, one confined in the
section on Germany to its alleged role in the disintegration and
collapse of the Weimar Republic. With the recent exception of
Eugene Anderson's excellent analysis of Pruss ian politics, however,
treatments of election systems have been for the most part unrelated
to the context of German society and politics. 1
The following study deals with an election system undoubtedly
the most controversial in German political history. It presents an
analysis of proportional representation, or as commonly abbreviated,
P. R., from the founding of the Second Reich through the first
elections under the Weimar electoral law. Its purpose is to relate
the development of P. R. to prevailing social and political conditions and attitudes, and in this manner to shed light on the nature
of the Weimar heritage.
Simply stated, P. R. is a technique designed to mirror in the
parliament the opinions and wishes of the voters (Chapter 1). Its
theoreticians call for representation of voter preferences exactly
in accordance with respective numerical strengths; and insofar as
all voters theoretically have equal opportunities to achieve repre1
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sentation of their particular points of view, the system or technique
is alleged to be the most democratic in existence. The idea of
P. R. was first expounded in developed form by French Utopians
and later incorporated in the programs of Marxian Revisionists
throughout Europe. It became attractive to political liberals like
John Stuart Mill concerned with the problem of the individual
and his survival from the pressures of modern civilization toward
"collective mediocrity." It assumed increasing significance to politicians of all persuasions in the conflicts arising out of industrialization between power elites and mass movements, between those who
wished to preserve and those who wished to alter or abolish the
existing order.
It is this latter context that forms the setting of the present
study (Chapter 2). Industrial production during the Second Reich
was expanding in phenomenal proportions; agricultural output was
dropping off sharply; rural areas were being drained of population
as urban centers mushroomed. Tensions mounted with the emergence of new social and political groups to challenge the dominate
positions of the old. Conservative agrarians became alarmed by the
rising mass of socialist-led workers which threatened their control
of the state, while middle-class liberals wavered between conservative antipathies and fears of the socialist movement.
Participants in the ensuing conflicts seized upon P. R. as one
means for achieving or maintaining power (Chapters 3, 4, 5). To
socialists with voting strengths scattered all over the Reich the
adoption of P. R. for all Landtag and Reichstag elections seemed
to offer the best likelihood of increased representation. To numerical minorities like the middle classes and the agrarians who feared
the potential power of socialist majorities among the industrial
workers, P. R. became useful both as a protection of their respective
minority positions and as a weapon against their opponents. It
could be introduced in urban districts where socialist majorities
were present, and withheld from others where the socialists were
in the minority. It could be adopted for elections to the numerous
boards and agencies which had arisen with social and factory
legislation to the end of undermining socialist monopolies in the
representation of workers' interests. Although hailed by its theoreticians as the most democratic system of election in existence. P. R.
was used almost extensively in Germany as an instrument of power
against those who had as their ultimate political objective the democratization of the Reich.
The paradox of P. R. in the social and political conflict was
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heightened by the profound ignorance of democratic ideas and
institutions revealed by the participants (Chapters 6, 7, 8). The
idea of popular sovereignity was incomprehensible; responsible
government through an elected parliament seemed un-German.
Political parties were viewed, not as means for assessing responsibility for public policy, but as organs for asserting minority points
of view in the social and political conflict. The mere adoption of
P. R. for parliamentary elections in 1918-1919 revealed at once the
background of division and conflict and the naivete of German conceptions of democracy. Supposedly the democratic system of election par excellence, P. R. was adopted by the Germans as a natural
consequence of republican government. Serious consideration of its
possible effects in practice upon political parties and the Reichstag
was conspicuously absent. Only with the first elections under P. R.
in 1919 and 1920 did the effects and their attendant dangers become manifest with the growing numbers and influence of splinter
groups and vested minority interests in the Reichstag.
Lacking the most elemental understanding of democratic ideas
and institutions, divided in the power struggle between those who
upheld the old regime and those who wished to tear it down,
possessing an election system which encouraged division rather than
consolidation, rigidity rather than compromise among their political
parties, the German people appeared strikingly ill-prepared and illequipped to assume the responsibilities of self-government so suddenly thrust upon them by the collapse of Kaiser Wilhelm's Reich.
The prelude to Weimar democracy was ominously undemocratic.

I
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Proportional Representation in Europe:
A Historical Sketch

idea of proportional representation, or P. R., dates at
least to the French Revolution. 1 In a speech before the
Assembly of Provence in January, 1789, Mirabeau allegedly
expressed the metaphor which later became so popular with proportionalists. "A representative body," he stated, "is to the nation
what a chart is for the physical configuration of its soil: in all its
parts, and as a whole, the representative body should at all times
present a reduced picture of the people-their opinions, aspirations,
and wishes ...."2 The words reflect one facet of the Revolutionary
demand for egalitt!, in this case for an equality among votes, for a
reflection in the parliament of all points of view in accordance
with their respective strengths among the electorate. Although
attempts were made subsequently by the Girondins, notably through
Condorcet's draft constitution of 1793, to introduce proportional
voting, the idea of electoral egalitt! became obscured in the ensuing
tumult of war and revolution.
The idea reappeared during the 1830's in French Utopian
circles, where discussions produced an ardent proportionalist in
Victor Considerant, Paris mathematician and social reformer. 3 As
formulated by Considerant, the argument for P. R. became one of
electoral justice, a necessity of including "all opinions, the most
absurd ones, the most monstrous ones even," in the parliament "in
a number proportional to their strength in the electorate."4 The
requirement of political egalitt! would otherwise be violated.
Not content merely with propagandizing in Paris journals,
Considerant journeyed to Switzerland during the 1840's in attempts
to persuade assemblies in that country to adopt proportional systems of election. So new and impractical did the idea of P. R.
appear to the Swiss, however, that apparently they regarded him
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as a crank. With incredulous smiles, even laughter, members of
the Geneva Council in 1842 and the National Council in 1846
summarily rejected his proposals without discussion.1i The idea was
as yet too untried, too utopian in nature to attract practical politicians.
The attractions emerged as P. R. came to be widely publicized
and discussed throughout Europe. In 1859 the first major publication about proportional elections appeared in England. Written
by Thomas Hare, a London barrister, The Election of Representatives6 elaborated a system of election termed by subsequent proportionalists the "single transferable vote." Voters according to
the plan could designate preferences among candidates on the
ballot by using numbers ("I" for the first choice, "2" for the second,
etc.). In the tabulation of results, the first-preference candidates
who acquired the necessary quota 7 were declared elected, with votes
in excess of that number transferred to the credit of those listed
second in preference. The process continued through successive
preferences until the total number of seats had been filled. 8
Response to the Hare plan was immediate and emphatic. In his
considerations on Representative Government, published in 1861,
John Stuart Mill found so may advantages in the plan that he could
place it "among the very greatest improvements yet made in the
theory and practice of government."9 The reasons for Mill's unqualified acceptance of proportional or "personal" representation,
as he and Hare termed the procedure, were to be found in his views
on representative government. Representation and government
were for him mutually exclusive, with parliaments regarded as
"radically unfit" for the "function of government." The latter
were to "watch and control the government," i.e., the ministries,
offices, etc., which administered the state. They were to form "the
nation's Committee of Grievances, and its Congress of Opinions";
they were "an arena" where "every interest and shade of opinion
in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded."lo It
followed for Mill that one of the most important advantages of
Hare's plan of election was its protection of numerical minorities
against the "despotic majority." By granting representation to
minorities, "distinguished" persons without party affiliations or
"local influence" could become elected, thereby raising "the intellectual standard of the House of Commons."l! The "instructed
elite" thus could withstand the "natural tendency of representative
government, as of modern civilization . . . towards collective
mediocrity. "12
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Mill's enthusiasm for Hare's "personal representation" did not
pass unchallenged. In articles published in the Fortnightly Review
in 1865 and 1867 and in the first edition of his work, The English
Constitution, published in 1867, Walter Bagehot, a fellow liberal
and economist, took sharp issue with the famous utilitarian. As
contrasted with Mill's dismissal of the parliament as "radically
unfit" for the "function of government," Bagehot found in that
institution the mainspring of political action. Governmental
policies were formulated and implemented by the majority, criticized by the minority. The parliament might become inadequate, or
"radically unfit," to perform these its essential functions, he contended, only if the Hare plan of election were adopted. The abolition of districts envisioned in the plan would encourage the
formation of "voluntary constituencies," or groups of like-minded
people scattered throughout the country. Each would rule "unflinchingly" the members which it returned to Parliament. The
individual M. P. would become "like the minister of a Dissenting
congregation: that congregation is collected by a unity of sentiment
in doctrine A, and the preacher is to preach doctrine A; if he does
not, he is dismissed."13 The result, Bagehot predicted, would be
disastrous for the composition and function of the House of Commons. "Instead of a deliberative assembly of moderate and judicious
men, we should have a various compound of all sorts of violence,"
one which would be "inconsistent with the extrinsic independence
as well as with the inherent moderation of a parliament."14 Injudicious minorities would usurp the will of the majority, and the
parliament would become "radically unfit" to perform the "function
of government."
The views expressed by Mill and Bagehot have remained the
classic statements of the case for and against P. R. As viewed by
the proponents, representation is a means of "photographing" the
electorate, of reflecting as accurately as possible in the parliament
the variegated opinions and desires of the voters. The view has
been shared by practical politicians concerned with tactics of survival and gain, and by political and mathematical theorists seeking
to protect individual rights and assure electoral "justice." Neither
group among the proponents has concerned itself to any appreciable extent with the related and fundamental problem of workability, with the capacity of what they term a "representative"
parliament to function effectively. Seemingly without question
each has equated proportional representation with efficient and
responsible government. 11i
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The chief question for the opponents has been: What will be
the effects of P. R. upon the capacity of the parliament for action?
Will the increased representation under P. R. of minority groups
and parties be an aid or deterrent in this regard? Their conclusions
have been denunciations of the system as incompatible with the
functioning of democratic government, as contributive to the
splintering of parties, and consequently to the paralyzation of
political initiative and the decay of democratic institutions and
procedures. For the opponents P. R. thus becomes in the last
analysis a Trojan horse capable of destroying the individual rights
which proportionalists so vigorously assert.16
Undeterred by Bagehot's objections to P. R., Mill moved an
amendment in the House of Commons attaching the Hare plan to
the electoral reform bill of 1867. Only by adopting the plan, he
contended during debate on the amendment, could the "principle
of democracy," i.e., "equal representation," be achieved in England.
At a time when political power supposedly was passing to the
"most numerous and poorest class," conservatives might well consider seriously a plan by which "no considerable minority could
possibly be swamped" at the polls.u Subsequent comments by
members of the House, however, revealed slight sympathy for the
plan. The House might well tum from such useless discussions
of "philosophical eccentricities" to "more serious business," suggested one M. P. who concluded rather unkindly, "God help them,"
if the House ever came to be formed entirely of philosophers. 18
Under pressure from his colleagues, Mill shortly withdrew the
amendment, and the House turned to "more serious business."
Subsequent attempts by other proportionalists to introduce the
Hare plan during the 1870's and 1880's likewise failed to move the
opposition.
Although P. R. movements achieved some success in the English-speaking countries of the world,19 the principal gains were in
Europe. There, despite the influence of Hare and Mill, parliaments
invariably adopted list systems rather than the single transferable
vote plan. Instead of one ballot containing the names of all the
candidates, voters were presented with several lists of candidates
submitted by the various parties. The act of voting hence became
essentially a choice among the lists, with seats being assigned among
the latter in proportion to the number of votes polled. The "personal" representation of Hare and Mill became "party" representation on the Continent.
Switzerland took the lead in the P. R. movement in Europe.

8
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A national organization, the Association Reformiste, appeared as
early as 1865, being founded, according to a report issued by the
Association the following year, for the purpose of studying "the
works of Mr. Hare."2o Members of the Association soon became
convinced, however, that the Hare plan was "too bold and too
foreign to our customs," presumably due to its personal rather than
party or group basis. They began shortly thereafter to advocate a
list system of representation patterned after one which the French
Utopian, Considerant, had vainly tried to persuade the Swiss to
accept more than thirty years previously.21 Despite the propagandizing efforts of the Association, however, P. R. was not adopted in
Switzerland for several decades. Beginning with Ticino in 1889,
the system then spread to eight other cantons by the outbreak of
the first world war, and finally was adopted in 1918 for elections
to the National Council, the lower house of the federal parliament.
List systems of election soon began to appear in other European
. countries. Serbia, which already had adopted one for local bodies
in 1888, extended it in 1899 for the election of most members of its
national parliament. Belgium did likewise the same year. Other
countries in Europe to adopt list systems for national elections
prior to the war were Finland (1906), Sweden (1909), Portugal
(1911), and Bulgaria (1911).22 Denmark (1915) and the Netherlands (1917) shortly followed suit. Despite the pressure of an
organized group of deputies within the French Chamber of Deputies
dating from the turn of the century, a proportional system using
lists was not adopted in that country until 1919.
Germany shared in the general movement toward P. R. in
Europe. Articles stimulated by the writings of Hare and Mill began
to appear during the early 1860's in South German journals. 23
Although the Hare plan was debated in the assemblies of Frankfort, Baden, and Wiirttemberg during the same decade,24 the adoption of proportional systems in Germany did not begin until after
1900. Then began a period of experimentation in various municipal, state, and federal bodies which led to the extension of P. R.
in 1918 for elections to the Reichstag. The National Assembly of
1919-1920 and subsequent Reichstags during the Weimar Republic
were elected under P. R.
Numerous variations among list systems emerged with the development of P. R. on the Continent. The first canton in Switzerland to use P. R. departed from the Hare plan by using lists, yet
adopted a similar method of allocating seats. Districts were retained, rather than abolished (as Hare desired), and a so-called
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"simple quota" was established by dividing the number of deputies
for each district into the total number of votes cast. Seats were
allocated among the lists by dividing the resultant quota into the
respective vote totals. A quota of 50,000, for example, would accord
one seat to the party list with 50,000 or more votes, two to the one
with 100,000 or more votes.
Politicians were plagued, however, by mathematical complications. What could be done with the votes for each list which were
not used in the allocation of seats? Assuming a seat quota of 50,000,
a party list with 60,000 had 10,0000 leftover, unutilized, wasted
votes. If the number of such votes for all party lists exceeded the
quota, then the allocation procedure failed even to allot all the
necessary seats in a given district. Not only votes, but also seats
might remain. With some misgivings about the matter of mathematical justice, proportionalists for a time merely distributed the
leftover seats among the lists with the largest vote totals. Eventually
they began to add one numeral to the divisor, i.e., to the number
of deputies to be elected, a procedure which decreased the quota
and hence the likelihood of leftover seats.
Mathematicians soon held out new and ever-more-complicated
solutions to the problem of achieving proportionality. Most important in terms of longevity was one constructed by the Belgian,
Victor d'Hondt. 25 As illustrated by the following example from a
hypothetical election, the vote totals of each list are divided by
the numerals I, 2, 3,4, etc.:
Divisor
I

2
3
4

Consenmtive
151,000
(I)
7.5,500
(3)
50,333Ys (4)
37,750

Progressive
83,000
(2)
41,500
(5)

Radical
34,000

Independent
32,000

Seats are allotted among the lists with the largest quotients. Assuming five seats to be distributed in the above example, the Conservatives would receive three and the Progressives two.
Still another problem for the proportionalists concerned the
allocation of seats among candidates within the party lists. Should
the seats be allotted among those at the top of the list or ticket?
Or should the voter be allowed some choice in the matter? The
most common solution in Germany was the "closed" list system
which denied voters choices among individual candidates. Seats
allotted to the ticket were distributed according to the sequence in
which candidates had been placed by the nominating party. For
the politicians this was "party" representation par excellence. An
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Prelude to Democracy

element of Hare's "personal" representation was introduced by the
so-called "open" lists. Voters according to the plan were permitted
to express one or more preferences among candidates on the ticket,
the most popular ones receiving the seats allotted to the ticket. As
refined in some Swiss cantons, voters even could distribute their
choices among candidates drawn from several tickets.
Such were the principal variations among Continental list
systems of election. Each was subjected to innumerable refinements
by mathematicians, jurists, and others possessing talents for abstraction. New ones of astounding complexity appeared as a consequence. So extensive was the experimentation that a British
parliamentary commission on electoral systems could report the
probable existence by 1910 of three hundred different systems of
proportional representation. 26
Subsequent experimentation throughout Europe and other parts
of the world, including the United States, increased both the number and the complexity of proportional systems of election. Italy,
Austria, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Greece, Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Norway, Finland, and even Luxembourg
adopted P. R. for national elections between the two world wars.
Perhaps the ultimate in complexity was achieved by the Germans
in the Weimar electoral law. Not only districts, but even groups
of districts, and finally a general clearing house or "Reich list"
provided successive stages for the utilization of leftover votes.
Clearly the parliament was to reflect as precisely as possible the
wishes of the electorate, with its capacity to govern a secondary,
indeed, an academic consideration.
Much the wiser from their tragic Weimar experience with selfgovernment, West Germans following the second world war consequently reassessed their positions on representation and parliamentary government. The resulting election law was a compromise
between the proponents of Mill and Bagehot, between those who
viewed representation as an end in itself, that of reflecting in the
parliament all shades of opinion among the voters, and those who
viewed it as a means to the end of responsible and efficient government. Each voter is empowered by the law to cast two ballots,one
for an individual candidate in his district, one for a party list of
the Land in which he resides. Candidates in the first instance are
elected by majority vote, those in the second from the party lists
according to the proportion of votes received by the list throughout
the Land. Majority elections in the districts favor large parties
capable of assuming and wielding political power, with the con-
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sequent contributIon to governmental stability. Proportional elections in the Laender afford representation to small parties and
hence facilitate the expression of minority points of view. "Personal" representation obtains in the districts, "party" representation in the Laender.
The West German law poses one solution to a fundamental
problem of modern government: the relation of individual rights to
the collective good, of the minority viewpoint to the majority will.
Formulated for the first time with reference to P. R. by Mill and
Bagehot, the problem has been one of general concern for political
philosophers from Locke to Rousseau through the political liberals
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It has assumed increasing significance with the far-reaching changes in society which have
accompanied industrialization. Agrarian minorities have sought
to maintain positions of power against rising industrial majorities,
which in tum have attempted to obtain power comparable to their
growing numerical as well as economic importance. It is in the
context of this struggle of minority versus majority, of power elites
versus mass movements that the present study seeks to analyze the
development of P. R. in Germany during the years 1871-1920.

2
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.The Setting

NDUSTRIALIZATION during the Second Reich fostered conditions
which were highly conducive to the development of P. R. Stimulated by the achievement of political unification, the economy
was transformed as coal and iron production spiraled to new and
unprecedented heights and major though less spectacular advances
took place in the textiles, chemical and electro-technical industries,
transportation, banking, and finance. Radical alterations of the
social picture occurred with the ensuing growth and shift of population. 1 Despite an over-all gain of more than sixteen million persons in the Reich between 1871 and 1914, the number of rural
dwellers remained almost stationary as the urban share of the
population increased from slightly more than one-third in 1871
to almost two-thirds in 1914.2 Conflicts followed as urban groups
arose to challenge the traditional domination of German society
and politics by the agrarians. In the Reichstag and in the Landtage
each among the competing groups sought means to extend its
representation and to divide and weaken the opposition. Each
found in P. R. an electoral technique easily adaptable to such ends.
Opposition to the old regime in Germany was centered in the
rising socialist movement. Each year, each decade witnessed slow
but steady increases of socialist strength in the Reichstag and in
state and local assemblies. Although founded by Marxists like
August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, the movement very early
reflected the peaceful revisionist sentiment of other leaders, notably
Ferdinand Lassalle. From the first political organization of workers,
the German Workingmen's Association founded in 1863, through
the Social Democratic Labor Party of 1869, the Socialist Labor
Party of 1875, and the Social Democratic Party of 1891, the platforms called for peaceful means to achieve the ends of democratization and socialization of the state. Conservative agrarians were
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nonetheless horrified by the implications of the socialist movement
for their positions of power. As landowners they were disturbed
by the attack on private property; and as members of the conservative elite which controlled the state they looked askance at socialist
intentions to democratize government in Germany.
The chief conservative bulwark against the socialist movement
was the dominant position of Prussia within the Reich. The
former's king and the latter's emperor were the same person. The
chancellor of the Reich was Prussia's prime minister, and as such,
headed his state's delegation to Germany's upper chamber, the
Bundesrat, and also presided over that body. Within the latter,
Prussia controlled the two-thirds majority necessary for any amendment to the constitution. State secretaries for the Reich also were
members of the Prussian state government. Neither they nor the
chancellor were responsible to the popularly elected body, the
Reichstag. Both held office at the pleasure of the emperor-king.
Despite Pruss ian domination of the federal government, however, conservatives found much to fear in the latter's parliamentary
features. Although neither the chancellor nor his ministers were
responsible to the Reichstag, the latter might impose important
checks on the actions of the government. It could initiate legislation, and block or amend bills presented by the government. Most
disturbing to the Prussian conservatives was the Reichstag's electoral law. Following the inclusion of Alsace-Lorraine in 1873, three
hundred ninety-seven districts were apportioned on the approximate
basis of one representative for each one hundred thousand inhabitants. 3 A majority of the votes cast was required for election. 4
The right to vote was not contingent upon tax payments or the
possession of property. All German men who had completed their
twenty-fifth year of age were enfranchised. No distinctions were
made among votes, each being theoretically equal to all others in
the election of deputies. Voters chose their representatives directly,
not through designated electors, and they cast their ballots in
secrecy.
The provisions were striking when compared with those of the
law regulating elections to the Prussian Lower House. Although
every Prussian male twenty-five years of age could vote, the suffrage
was not equal, direct, nor secret. Voters were divided into three
classes according to the amount of taxes paid. The members of
each class selected by public voting one-third of the electors. The
latter then met in each district for the selection of usually two,
frequently one, and in some cases as many as four deputies. Since

14
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selection was by absolute majority, electors from the first two classes
could combine to outvote those in the third. 5
The electoral law for the Reichstag accorded political expression
to the emerging socialist movement in Germany; therein lay its
significance for the Prussian conservatives. Workers were free in
the privacy of the voting booth to elect socialists without fear of
reprisals from their employers. The tremendous increases in population which had gone to swell the movement were not deprived of
political significance in the Reich as they were in Prussia by restricting the overwhelming majority of the voters to a fraction of
representation in the Reichstag. Although urban areas where
socialist voting strengths were concentrated eventually became
grossly underprepresented as a consequence of population growths
and the lack of redistricting, the composition of the Reichstag
nevertheless reflected, if imperfectly, the surge of the movement.
From one of the smallest among Germany's political parties at the
founding of the Reich, the Social Democrats by 1912 had become the
Reichstag's largest single party.
Conservative fear of the socialist movement was shared by
Gennany's industrialists. Although most employers in comparatively small enterprises eventually came to terms with both
socialist and nonsocialist trade unions and recognized the value
of collective bargaining in harmonizing relations with employees,
representatives of heavy industry for the most part reacted violently against any suggestions of altering the subordinate position of the
workers in industry. The head of the Krupp munition works in
Essen, for example, asserted his intentions to remain "master in
his own house," and stubbornly refused to deal with trade union
leaders. Baron von Stumm, who controlled a huge iron and steel
empire in the Saar, declared his dislike of "artificial creations" like
trade unions between himself and his employees, even forbidding
the latter to read certain newspapers on threat of dismissal. 6 The
common ownership and control of all productive enterprises advocated by Social Democrats was a frightening prospect for employers in small and light industries. For individuals like von
Stumm and Krupp, who wielded such tremendous economic power,
the prospect was anathema.
Antisocialist feeling also penneated large sections of the middle
classes in Gennany. As reported by one observer, "the Rhenish
shopkeeper, the Black Forest clockmaker, the Pomeranian peasant
farmer,-all have shuddered alike at the growing power and influence of Social Democracy and regarded almost any means as
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holy that would tend to defeat its ultimate success."7 A deep gulf
separated the socialists from the "respectable" elements of German
society. They were abhorred for their advanced views on marriage
and the family and the position of women in society, for their attacks on religion and the monarchy, for their internationalism and
consequent opposition to narrow patriotism. The socialists themselves widened the gap by developing during the decade of Bismarck's antisocialist legislation and passing on to the new generation an almost caste like attitude of hostility toward all other
groups in society.s
Middle-class feeling against the socialists was modified only
gradually toward the end of the Second Reich. When food prices
rose to unprecedented heights during the first decade of the century, members of the consuming public, both middle class and
proletarian, became aware of a common enemy, the agrarianindustrialist alliance which enforced high import duties on foodstuffs. Left-liberals like Friedrich Naumann, leader of the Progressive party, began to inveigh against the conservative agrarian
domination of Germany, calling openly for an alliance of the middle
classes with socialist working groupS.9
Under the influence of revisionists within their own party,
socialists also began to move towards a modus vivendi with the
middle classes. The new approach was illustrated by an assertion
of the Bavarian leader, Georg von Vollmar, that "the German working classes would have better promise of success, if, in addition to
the three millions whom we number, three millions more in the
Bourgeois camp might be counted ready to ally themselves with
labour in a work of resolute political and social reform."lO A
gradual softening of mutual antipathies was to be seen in an increasing cooperation between the socialists and left-liberal groups
like Naumann's Progressives. The cooperation took the form of
electoral alliances in second or runoff elections to the Reichstag
and the mutual support of common social and political objectives
within the Reichstag and various state legislatures.
The rapprochement heightened the significance of the suffrage
for the agrarians and the industrialists. Entrenched in Prussia by
the three-class voting system, the agrarians could easily thwart
parlimentary reforms demanded by the socialists and left-liberals.
In the Reichstag, however, they were handicapped as a numerical
minority by the presence of universal manhood suffrage, and maintained political power chiefly due to that body's political incompetence. The danger of the socialist-left-liberal rapprochement be-
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came apparent as the Reichstag gradually began to check and influence policy decisions by the chancellor and his ministers, to move
slowly and hesitantly toward parliamentary government after the
English model. Control of the state by a coalition opposed to the
conservative elite appeared imminent. Proposals to abolish or at
least to restrict the workings of universial manhood suffrage began
to pour from conservative pens. Parliaments of experts, representation by occupation, proportional representation, and complex combinations of these and other plans were offered in the attempt to
diminish or abolish the Reichstag's competence or potential competence in the direction of national affairs.
Suffrage reform also became an important issue within the
various federal states. Despite efforts by property-owning groups to
bar industrial workers from a voice in local affairs, socialist penetration of municipal government had increased with each decade.
The representation of socialists on the city council in Berlin, for
example, rose from five (out of one hundred forty-four seats) in
1884 to sixteen in 1895 to forty-five by the outbreak of the war.
Permanent majorities were acquired on the councils of some cities
and towns smaller than Berlin.!1 Socialist deputies also began to
appear in increasing numbers in state legislatures, particularly in
South Germany, where there were fewer restrictions on the suffrage
than in Prussia. Even the latter's three-class system of voting could
not completely deprive them of representation; by 1913 there were
ten socialists in the Lower House. Property-holding or tax-payment
qualifications for voting consequently were raised in several places.
Proportional representation was introduced in urban areas where
socialist voting strengths were concentrated, hence assuring representation to minority groups at the latter's expense. With these
and related manipulations of the suffrage, nonsocialist groups
sought to preserve political power.
The course of suffrage reform in Germany clearly reflects the
significance of election systems in modern societies. 12 As popularly
elected assemblies and councils played larger roles in both local
and national affairs, the suffrage became as never before a means
of achieving or maintaining political power. Liberals fought to
maintain property qualifications and other restrictions upon voting
which accorded them representation in proportion with their economic importance in the state, out of proportion with their numerical strength. Socialists strove for universal suffrage and other means
of achieving representation in accordance with their growing numbers. Even the conservatives were forced into the rough-and-tumble
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of parliamentary politics which they disliked in order to achieve
protection of traditional rights and interests.
That each found in some form of proportional representation
a means to such diverse ends illustrates the adaptability of this
electoral technique. As a way of achieving proportionality of
deputies to votes it was attractive to the Social Democrats whose
scattered electoral strengths failed to secure representation under
the majority system. To numerical minorities like the liberals and
the conservatives who feared the potential influence of industrial
worker majorities, P. R. seemed useful both as a protection of their
respective viewpoints and as a way of splintering the socialist movement, of destroying its unity through affording expression to deviant or revisionist tendencies. P. R. had become a potent instrument of power in a setting of change and conflict.
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The Participants: Proposals for Suffrage Reform

niversal suffrage is communism in politics!" exclaimed an
elderly Gennan conservative, a self-styled "old deputy" writing in the midst of Bismarck's antisocialist crusade.1 Nowhere in the world, he lamented, had social democracy made such
progress as in Gennany; nowhere had the number of socialist voters
grown to such "colossal dimensions." Gennany was imperiled by
an electoral law which gave full expression to those seeking to destroy the state. Quietly but effectively the law was subverting the
Gennan way of life. Even without prompting from socialist agitators, the common voter was beginning to reason: "If I am able to
decide the fate of the nation, if I have just as much political power
as the pastor and the baron, then I must also be entitled to eat just
as well as the pastor." "Political communism" in the electoral law
was fostering "economic communism" in the social order.
Salvation lay for the "old deputy" in electoral reform. Only
restrictions on the suffrage, he asserted, could save Gennany from
the threat of communism. Universal suffrage should be abolished
and the Reichstag filled with deputies drawn from the municipalities and the occupations. 2 From one-half to two-thirds were to be
selected from the memberships of municipal and city councils and
from municipal electors, with the remainder distributed among
rural and urban workers, industrialists, merchants, and professional
men like university professors, jurists, doctors, etc. Even journalists
were to be extended representation provided they kept their
organizations free of all "unclean," presumably socialist, elements.
At least a majority of the Reichstag deputies thus would be chosen
by the municipalities, the greatest share of whom would be elected
under systems of restricted suffrage or perhaps appointed directly by
local authorities. Social Democrats would be conspicuously absent.
Confronted by a Reichstag so constructed, even the most ignorant
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peasant could not mistake his political and social inferiority. None
could presume an equality with the pastor or the baron. Germany
would be saved from the threat of communism.
Similar manipulations of the suffrage were contemplated by the
middle classes. As expressed by one contemporary of the "old
deputy," Germany was confronted by the "spectre of a social revolution."3 Spectacular gains had been made by a socialist party seeking to overthrow the existing order in Germany. Opposing measures
and social legislation had not halted its meteoric rise. Other means
must be found to preserve the state from its "threatened dissolution."
The "rotten fermentation" of socialism could be eliminated
from the body politic, the writer contended, by a revision of the
electoral system. Large numbers of the discontented who voted
socialist would remain loyal to the existing order if given the opportunity to express themselves and to obtain redress of their
grievances. Offer means for the peaceful expression of such interests,
he predicted, and the ground would be cut from under the
socialists. Two working groups would appear in the Reichstag, one
of doctrinare socialists who would continue to reject compromise,
and another which, in return for consideration of its interests,
would work peacefully and constructively within the existing order.4
The electoral reform proposed by the writer combined proportional representation with a representation of occupational
groups. Political parties could present in each electoral district
lists of candidates from six different occupational groups (agriculture and forestry; industry; commerce and communications;
domestic services; public and private services; the unemployed).
Each voter would cast his ballot for the list of his occupational
group. The number of seats in the parliament for each occupational
group was to be established in proportion to the number of persons
engaged in each.1i The writer offered a comparison of seats by
occupation in the Reichstag at that time (1885) and seats if division were made according to the proportion of persons engaged in
each occupation. 6 The former are listed below in the first column,
the latter in the second column:
Agriculture and Forestry
Industry
Commerce and Communications
Domestic Services
Public and Private Services
Unemployed

130
41

174
143

21
172

40
8
15

33

17

A Reichstag composed proportionally by occupation hence would
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have brought in 1885 a substantial increase in the representation
of industrial interests. The latter, when combined with those of
commerce and communications, would have approximately balanced
agricultural interests. Within the industrial classification the introduction of proportional representation would have deprived the
socialists of their monopoly in the representation of working class
interests. The body politic would have been saved in this manner
from the "rotten fermentation" of socialism.
Both the socialists and the agrarians would have lost representation in the Reichstag through another proposal termed by its author
"the ideal electoral system."7 Every candidate who received 30,000
votes would be elected. To thwart an excessive accumulation of
votes for popular candidates, the election would last two days.
Votes would not be wasted the second day on candidates already
elected. The system was "ideal" for two reasons. Since representation was accorded by population, rather than by area or district,
an "overwhelmingly agrarian representation" of an "industrial
state" would be eliminated. The system might also destroy the
Social Democratic party. The millions who voted for the party in
Reichstag elections, so the author asserted, did not read Das Kapital
and swear by the Communist Manifesto. "They are much more the
mass of discontented who vote Social Democratic with justifiable
resentment because it is not possible for them to elect a man of
their own point of view."8 Adopt the "ideal electoral system," the
author proudly predicted, and the Social Democratic party would
fall apart. It would splinter into a multiplicity of particularistic
groups, revisionists, and doctrinaires. The united front of workingclass interests led by the socialists thus would disintegrate. The
socialist movement would collapse.
Such proposals revealed, not only the instrumental significance
assumed by the suffrage in a society of conflict, but also the changing
attitudes in Germany toward traditional electoral techniques and
institutions. Territorial districts were for the most part discarded
as anachronistic. Political parties frequently were abandoned as
inadequate expressions of new and changing interests. Even the
legislative assembly itself came under fire as unsuited to the needs
and demands of modern political life.
The criticisms of territorial districts found in proposals for
suffrage reform during the Second Reich were summarized by one
writer in the following words:
The electoral district system was good in a period when the
population was still basically homogeneous, and when our
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modern means of communication had not yet developed.
Those living in close proximity had common interests and
common points of view. Today the situation is different.
The population is much more differentiated, yet more closely-knit than before. Each of us today has more in common
with hundreds and thousands of peoJ?le scattered all over
the Reich than with the people who hve in the same street
or even in the same house. 9
To give expression to these new political relationships the writer
offered a plan noteworthy for its simplicity: abolish electoral districts and send to the Reichstag the four hundred candidates who
received the most votes. Among the consequences, he predicted,
would be a complete destruction of existing political parties, a fate
not undeserved, since they had failed to afford expression to the
important economic and social interests of the voters. Their places
would be taken by the various occupational groups, which would
send their respective representatives to the Reichstag.
Would not the breakdown of the party structure and the emergence of numerous interest groups, large and small, be detrimental
to the workability of the parliament? The writer professed to see
no difficulties in this regard:
... If the bimetalists, the enemies of alcohol or the vaccine
opponents wish to organize to obtain a representative of their
views, on what grounds should they be prevented from doing
so? These representatives could be quite sensible in other
respects; for everybody probably has one screw loose, and he
who doubts that has two.1°

The writer betrayed his own peculiarity in the latter regard by his
stipulation for proportional voting in the Reichstag. Each deputy
would have one vote for every thousand ballots or fraction thereof
which he polled in the election. Would not voting in the Reichstag
become hopelessly complicated? Not at all. The writer recommended a comptometer especially designed for the purposel l l
The widespread criticism of political parties in Germany
stemmed in part from the nature of the Reichstag. Restricted in its
competence by the absence of constitutional checks upon the actions
of the chancellor, and by the preponderance of Prussia in the
quasi-federal organization of the Reich, the Reichstag, at least until
during the war, wielded very little political power. Strong personalities were conspicuous by their absence; administrative positions with the government offered more favorable opportunities
for personal advancement than membership in the national legisla-
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ture. The parties were accused by their critics, moreover, of
exercising a "tyranny of ignorance" in the Reichstag.12 Deputies
were, for the most part, lawyers, editors, journalists, party secretaries, and professional politicians. Representatives of industry and
commerce, asserted the critics, were too few; only agriculture was
represented adequately. How could deputies from such nonmaterial
vocations, they demanded, deal intelligently with the intricate and
technical problems of legislation in modem society?
The media which many Germans wished to substitute for political parties were new organizations which had begun to assume
important social and political functions. During the 1860's employers' associations began to appear to promote the general interests of various branches of economic activity and to protect
employers' interests against consumers' and workers' organizations.
The number of such associations jumped from less than 700 by the
tum of the century to more than 3,000 shortly before the war.1S
Although hampered by the hostility and suspicion of the government and dominant economic groups like the employers, a trade
union movement also had emerged by the tum of the century.
Approximately 2,500,000 workers belonged shortly before the war
to so-called "free" unions which were Social Democratic in orientation, and 500,000 others were distributed among the "Christian,"
"Hirsch-Duncker," and independent unions. 14 Salaried employees
also formed their own organizations, numbering 600,000 in membership by 1914. In addition to the Agrarian League, which by 1907
included almost 300,000 members, several organizations of peasants
were to be found in Germany following the turn of the century.
Consumers' unions by 1914 included almost 2,500,000 persons. 111
As government increased in complexity with industrialization,
the Landtage became more and more dependent upon such organizations. Special legislative committees obtained their assistance in
drafting detailed and complicated legislation. Extraparliamentary
advisory bodies were formed out of their membership. In 1880 a
permanent economic council was established in Prussia at Bismarck's instigation. l6 Although the Reichstag rejected an attempt
by Bismarck to create a similar council for the Reich the following
year, ad hoc commissions of enquiry were established with increasing frequency, especially during the warP
What implications did expert assistance in the legislative process
hold for the future of representative assemblies in Germany? "We
are thus confronted by the fact," concluded one observer, "that ...
popular assemblies . . . are becoming decreasingly suited to the
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pOSItIVe demands of the total organism. Increasingly must they
abdicate ... functions to other organs which have developed out
of the natural arrangement of the total organism."18 A leading
political analyst in Germany, Georg Jellinek, pointed out that "increasingly diverse and inter-related groups unite the innumerable
human interests to which we vainly attempt to accord expression
in the formation of a parliament."19 The problem could be resolved, according to many observers, by abolishing the Reichstag and
creating a parliament of experts. Only representatives chosen by
vocational groups, they maintained, were competent to sit in the
parliament. Only they were qualified to conduct the important
business of the latter solely in accordance with factual considerations. Only they could be trusted never to confuse important issues,
never to transpose a "yo. for a "z." Unquestionably they would
comprise, in the words of one writer, a "chamber of experts, par
excellence."2o
One enthusiast for the superiority of experts in the lawmaking
process wished to give Germany not one, but three parliaments.21
Each voter, according to his proposal, could belong to five different
political parties, organizations, associations, etc. He could cast
five ballots, one apiece for candidates of his choice presented by
his five respective parties, organizations, etc. Each of the latter
could elect three deputies for each unit of 100,000 members. The
deputies elected were to be distributed equally among three separate
parliaments of specialists: a Kultttrparlament for religious, educational, and "national" affairs; a Wirtschaftliche Parlament for
trade, industry, production, social matters; a Fachparlament fur
Staatsnotwendigkeiten for finance, administration, foreign and military affairs, etc. The activities of the three parliaments were to be
coordinated by a committee at the top composed of representatives
from each.
The author was quite certain that his three parliaments not
only would reflect the "common will" but also would provide
Germany with an instrument for political action. He neglected to
inform his readers, however, concerning the ways in which religious,
educational, and "national" affairs differed from those concerning
industry, production, and social problems, and how all could be
separated so arbitrarily from matters of finance and administration.
The curious reader, for example, might have inquired how the
three parliaments would have dealt with the insurance legislation
passed during the 1880's by the Reichstag. Would the extent of the
insurance have been the concern of experts in industrial and social
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problems, or those in finance and administration? Or perhaps it
would have been a "national" problem?
Proportional representation was offered increasingly by the
middle classes in Germany as a solution to the criticism that elected
assemblies no longer represented adequately the important social
and economic groups. Abolish false divisions of the electorate by
territorial districts, argued many advocates of P. R., and allow the
voters separated by distance but united by occupation or other common interests an opportunity to elect persons more qualified by
expert knowledge than by vote-getting abilities. Professional politicians, the rabble-rousers with their mass appeals to emotion and
ignorance, would be swept from office. The parliament elected
under P. R., they asserted, would contain persons competent to
legislate on the important social and economic problems confronting the German people.
The above view was well illustrated in the writings of Karl
Gageur, a Baden lawyer who took up the cause of P. R. during the
1890's.22 Gageur attacked the majority system and election by district as inadequate media for the representation of economic and
social interests. In what manner, he asked, were the important
interests of trade, commerce, industry, and religion represented in
the popular assembly? Purely by chance, he replied. Arbitrary
divisions of the electorate by territorial district denied the "natural
arrangement" of human society into social classes. Society was
atomized; classes were chopped up and reduced to impotence. The
process was furthered, he maintained, by the majority system, with
its denial of representation to classes which within the arbitrarily
created electoral districts were minority groups.
A proportional representation of social classes was Mr. Gageur's
solution to the problem of representation in modern Germany. A
Reichstag so contituted would afford expression to the "natural arrangement" of human society. The bitterness and antipathy fostered
among classes by the majority system would disappear. No longer,
he contended, would competing groups have the opportunity to
acquire a monopoly of political power; no longer could they
anticipate exclusion of others from political life. Each would be
assured by proportional elections of its fair representation in the
parliament. Conveniently relieved in this manner of the bitterness
and antipathy fostered in the struggle for political power under
majority elections, secure in the knowledge that each could not
eliminate the other or become eliminated, representatives of labor
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and management would sit down in peace together to "carefully
weigh and consider the claims of each."23
Would the Reichstag, split into more factions than ever before,
have become a more effective instrument of political action than
it had been in the past? Would the smiling representatives of
management and labor, relieved of their political antipathies as a
consequence of proportional elections, have inaugurated important
new social and economic policies? Such results were so obvious to
Mr. Gageur that he neglected to discuss them. The claims which
he made for proportional representation at least reflected a softening
of the middle-class attitude toward the workers and their socialist
leaders. The latter were regarded by him as potent forces on the
social and political scene, forces whose importance had grown
with each stage of Germany's rapid industrialization. The fact of
their presence could not be denied; neither could the necessity for
including them in constructive political activity through the elected
parliament.
The contention that P. R. was more suited than the majority
system to the requirements of representation in modern society appeared in the writings of another middle-class liberal, Dr. Ernst
Cahn, whose claims for the system rivaled in certain respects those
of Mr. Gageur in abstraction. Germany's traditional political parties, Dr. Cahn asserted in one of his numerous publications, represented so-called "idealistic" points of view, i.e., those which were
predominantly religious, constitutional, or cultural in emphasis. 24
Industrialization, however, had given rise to numerous and divergent economic interest in Germany which clamored for expression.
It was Dr. Cahn's contention that voters were entitled to send to
the Reichstag representatives of the new economic as well as of the
older "idealistic" points of view. They were denied the opportunity
to do so, he asserted, since the majority system hindered the representation of minority groups. The introduction of P. R. would
guarantee that opportunity:
It seems especially to be an attraction of the system of pro-

portional representation that it grants the voters complete
freedom to group themselves around the viewpoints of their
choice. If they wish to group themselves around an economic
point of view, they are free to do so; if they wish to rally
around an idealistic point of view, they will not be hindered
in doing so. The system of proportional representation
. allows in this manner for the endless variety of modern
social, economic, religious-moral, cultural situations which
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underlie the psychological motivation of the individual person. 211
The distinction between parties which were predominantly
"idealistic" and those which were "economic" must have aroused
some curiosity among Dr. Cahn's readers. In which category, they
might have asked, did he place Germany's Conservative party? Unquestionably it was one of the "older" parties, Protestant, Prussian,
and monarchical in conviction, yet it also represented the agrarian
interests in Germany. Or what about the left-liberal or Progressive
party to which Dr. Cahn belonged? Were not the left-liberals among
Germany's oldest political groups? Had they not followed, with
some deviations, the traditional liberal emphasis upon individual
rights and parliamentary government? Did they not also represent
the economic interests of the merchants, the shopkeepers, the handworkers, etc.?
Had the curious reader pursued further his inquiry into Dr.
Cahn's views on political parties, he might have discovered an
article published by him in 1909 in a left-liberal journal. The
article was entitled "The Political Significance of the System of
Proportional Representation." Had he perused the article, the
reader might have found Dr. Cahn's conclusions highly rewarding,
if not surprising:
... We would have had a liberal majority (including the
National Liberals, of course) in the Reichstag today had we
possessed the proportional representation system. Also the
goal of a majority composed of the left-liberals and the
Social Democrats still may be realized most 9uickly with the
system of proportional representation.... WIth the majority
system thIS goal would he much farther distant. We must
therefore strive for proportional representation in order to
attain more quickly our ultimate political ends. 26
Apparently the left-liberals were neither "economic" nor "idealistic"
in character. They were by implication more interested in the
acquisition of political power than with any other consideration.
P. R. seemed to be significant to Dr. Cahn more as an instrument
of power politics than as a means of facilitating "the psychological
motivation of the individual person_"
Dr. Cahn's advocacy of coalition with the Social Democrats
reflected an important change in middle-class thinking on the
socialists in Germany. The latter gradually had acquired in the
eyes of the left-liberals a certain social and political respectability.
Although Chancellor Biilow in 1907 denounced the socialists as
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Reichsfeinde, as enemies of the state, just as violently as Bismarck
had done in 1878, left-liberals after 1900 gradually began to revise
their views on the socialists, to regard them as possible allies in the
struggle with agrarian and conservative forces.
The socialists themselves were in large part responsible for the
changing liberal attitude. Revisionist tendencies had developed
within their ranks as the party acquired strength in Germany.
Leaders and writers like Eduard Bernstein, Ludwig Quessel, and
others began to urge revision of the traditional Marxist tenets of
economic crises and the class struggle. Socialist theory, they contended, must be harmonized with the practical aims contained in
the party's program of Erfurt, a program which called for democratization as well as socialization of the Reich. The revisionists began
to call openly for an alliance of workingman and middle-class interests to that end. "Although the interests of the new middle class
and the workers do not coincide in all respects," wrote Quessel in
1911, "they are nevertheless not so basically different as to prevent
an agreement and a modus vivendi."27 Despite official denunciations by party congresses of collaboration with the middle classes,
socialists became increasingly revisionist in their day-to-day activities. Representatives in the various Landtage, particularly in South
Germany, collaborated openly with left-liberal parties on common
social and political objectives. Alliances were formed increasingly
with the latter for runoff election contests to the Reichstag.
Unanimity between the two groups soon developed on the matter of suffrage reform. Left-liberal factions like the National
Socialist party and the German People's party had declared themselves by 1899 for P. R. for municipal elections. Despite the vociferous if inconsistent opposition of the Progressive leader Friedrich
Naumann to P. R., left-liberals came more and more to favor the
system for Reichstag elections under the influence of publicists like
Ernst Cahn and following disappointments at the polls.28
The socialists, for their part, long had advocated P. R. for
Reichstag elections. Article One of the Erfurt program adopted in
1891 called in part for
Universal, equal, direct suffrage with secret balloting for all
citizens of the Reich over 20 years of age irrespective of sex
for all elections and plebiscites. Proportional representation;
and until its establishment, statutory redivision of electoral
districts after every census.29
The socialists had grown increasingly irritated prior to 1891 with
the growing disparity between the proportion of votes polled and
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seats acquired in the Reichstag. In 1887, for example, the party
received II seats in the Reichstag; a system of full proportionality
would have raised the number to 40. In 1890 the party received
35 seats; the proportional figure would have been 78. The principal reason for the party's difficulties in this respect lay in the
antiquated division of electoral districts for Reichstag elections.
The population displacements which had accompanied industrialization had thrown out of proportion the theoretical equality in terms
of population established in 1871 among the electoral districts.
Districts ranging in population from less than 50,000 inhabitants
to more than 300,000 all elected one deputy apiece. 30 Since the
Social Democratic party was most heavily concentrated in the large
industrial districts, its representation in the Reichstag failed to
reflect accurately the rapid increase in the number of votes polled.
As revealed in their party debates, the socialists unquestionably
expected to gain power in the Reichstag through any plan to effect a
redistribution of seats based on population. In the words of Wilhelm Liebknecht to the assembled delegates to the party congres!.
at Halle in 1890,
Social Democracy today has a much smaller representation
in the Reichstag in proportion to its voting strength than the
other parties; it has, for example, only about one-third the
representation of the Center. Although the Center receives
fewer votes than we, it nevertheless has three times as many
deputies. sl
Liebknecht concluded with a plea for P. R. to remedy what he
termed "this flagrant injustice." It was in P. R. rather than an
actual redistribution of districts that the socialists placed their
greatest hope. They anticipated gains from either plan, but in
particular from P. R. Despite their frequent majorities in large
urban districts, the socialists in 1891 still were a minority party in
most districts. Redistricting would increase their representation
considerably. The introduction of P. R. would accomplish the same
end, the socialists reasoned, and also would enable the party to capture seats in those districts where it was in the minority. Liebknecht
expressed this line of reasoning at the congress of Erfurt in 1891
when he stated:
Our party would profit greatly from this electoral system, for,
as you all know, we are scattered all over Germany. We are
not found only in certain areas like the Center and other
parties; we are not heavily concentrated in individual localities. Social Democracy is everywhere in Germany, just as it is
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everywhere in the world. But we are a young party, and
those electoral districts in which we now comprise the majority are comparatively few. With the present system of
election we lose the greater half of our votes-under the
proportional system of election the number of our deputies
would be approximately doubled and even tripled. 32
P. R. was an old demand within the Social Democratic party
even by 1891. As Liebknecht asserted to the delegates at the party
congress at Halle in 1890, he had advocated the system "for decades,
even before there was a Social Democratic Party."33 In 1849 he is
reported to have delivered a lecture on P. R. in Geneva, Switzerland. Articles on the system were published by him in German
journals in 1866-1867 and again in 1873.34 In the lattersli he advocated replacing the newly enacted electoral law for the Reichstag
by one which would reflect accurately the "currents" of "thought
and feeling" within the electorate. The suffrage should be freed of
"artificially created divisions" like electoral districts; each ballot
should be accorded equal weight insofar as possible by requiring
a uniform vote total for the election of deputies.
In 1877 and 1878 P. R. was discussed in a series of articles published by socialist authors in a party journal, Die Zukunft. The
writers who advocated P. R. were one in denouncing the electoral
law for the Reichstag. The present arrangement, they reiterated,
with division by territorial district and election by the majority
system, created a parliament which reflected imperfectly the various
shades of opinion within the electorate. In the words of one writer,
The parliament is not a valid expression of the popular
temper; it is not a reflection of the views and the parties
which prevail within the population. It is rather a representation in which chance majorities emerge amidst heated
struggles and wanton irregularities, while large fractions of
the population are restricted in their representation or robbed
of it entirely.36
August Bebel, a leading advocate of P. R. among the socialists,
viewed representation as a right, not of the individual, but of the
party. "It should be the purpose of a just party representation,"
he stated in Die ZUkunft in 1878, "that every party has seats and
votes in the popular assembly in exact proportion to the relation
between the number of votes which it received and the total number of votes cast."37
Only one socialist writing in Die Zukunft in 1877-1878 opposed
P. R.3S Party members were fooling themselves, he contended, when
they anticipated increased representation in the Reichstag through
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P. R. Their anticipations were based on electoral statistics which
did not reveal accurately the proportional voting strengths of the
various parties. Many parties, he pointed out, did not nominate
candidates in districts where they had no chance of election. The
Social Democrats, however, nominated "test candidates" wherever
they could, and hence acquired a larger proportional vote. "With
the establishment of the proportional system with all the possible
mathematical ingenuities," he concluded, "I fear the relative proportion [between votes received and seats acquired] would turn to
the disadvantage of the Social Democratic party, for we must not
forget that the other parties for the most part do not nominate
test candidates."39 The writer's conclusions-prophetic in view of
socialist experience with P. R. during the Weimar period-went
unheeded. The Social Democrats came to regard P. R. as a panacea
for the party's difficulties with electoral district inequalities. They
continued to do so long after the party would have benefited more
from a redistribution of electoral districts than from P. R.40
Although the socialists consistently advocated P. R. for the
Reichstag and the Landtage after 1891 with the expectation of
increased representation, they did not seek to justify the system in
terms of its supposed advantages to the Social Democratic party.
The party line in this instance was Gerechtigkeit (justice). Socialist
speakers in the Reichstag and the Landtage reiterated the accumulation of "injustice" against an electoral arrangement which
"denied" representation to minority groups. Party theorists even
peered through the tinted spectrum and discovered P. R. and
Gerechtigkeit to be essential to the Marxist class struggle concept.
The cardinal principle of modern political life, according to one
socialist writing in 1913,
is division by class and the class struggle. In the first place,
therefore, every citizen must not isolate himself, but must
seek his representative together with other members of his
class in combination with others of like conviction. Secondly,
he must be represented directly. In no event, therefore, can
he sanction a representative who is alien or even hostile to
his class status and political conviction. Thirdly, no group
composed of individuals of one class combined with those
of like conviction should lose a single one of its votes. 41
It was the writer's conviction that P. R. was the only system of
election which could meet these conditions.
Criticisms of the Reichstag election law and proposals for its
reform hence reflected the tremendous changes which had accom-
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panied Germany's economic development. Industrialization had
undermined the economic position of the agrarian forces which
dominated German society and politics. Industrialization had
spawned a huge mass of workers whose power was exploited by the
socialists and later by middle-class liberals in attempts to undermine the traditional conservative domination. The suffrage became
in the struggle an instrument for the preservation or extension of
power. Competing groups sought in electoral reform a weapon
against their opponents and a means to enhance their respective
positions. That P. R. appeared so frequently in the reform proposals
was due in no small part to the comparative ease with which it
could be combined with other election procedures and techniques
like the majority system, occupational representation, and plural
voting. The system also recommended itself as a technique by
which competing groups might utilize to the fullest possible advantage elements of support scattered throughout the Reich. P. R.
in these respects appeared to be most suited as an instrument for
power amidst the change and diversity which had come to characterize German society.
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The Participants: Experimentation with
Proportional Representation

struggle for power in Germany fostered widespread experimentation with P. R. by legislative bodies. Participants in
the struggle introduced proportional voting for elections to
federal courts of conciliation in commerce and industry, and later
for the selection of boards for the administration of Germany's comprehensive system of social insurance. Several states under their
urging also adopted limited proportional voting for municipal and
Landtag elections. In almost every case the reforms were attempts to
combat the rising power and influence of the socialist movement.
Experimentation with P. R. in Germany began in federal industrial courts.! As part of William II's plan to lessen the attraction of the socialist movement to German workers, the courts were
established by law in 1890 primarily as agencies for the settlement
of financial disputes between employers and workers in industrial
enterprises. 2 They also functioned as boards of conciliation in the
event of actual or threatened strikes. At first the courts were established only upon the initiative of workers, employers, or municipal
authorities; in 1901 they became mandatory for all municipalities
(Gemeinden) with more than 20,000 inhabitants. Members were
chosen in equal numbers by employers and workers for terms ranging from one to six years; a president and one deputy, belonging by
occupation to neither side, were appointed by municipal authorities. As amended in 1901, the election procedure could include
P. R. at the option of these authorities.s
The introduction of P. R., especially as an optional election
procedure, was directed against the socialist movement. Middleclass parties and groups which dominated municipal government
could be expected to introduce P. R. where the socialists held majorities and withhold it where the latter were in the minority. In
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the latter event, majority elections would continue tu deprive the
socialists of representation; in the former, proportional elections
would end their control of worker representation on the courts by
according expression to nonsocialist minorities. The consequences in
either event would be detrimental to the socialists, undermining
their almost exclusive representation of worker interests on the
courts and hence their power position in the negotiation of industrial disputes.
The utilization of P. R. to such ends was denounced by the
socialists. "You wish to use this suffrage," a Social Democratic
spokesman asserted to his party's opponents in the Reichstag, "only
when it benefits you, [only] . . . as a means of quelling political
opponents." Local municipal authorities empowered to adopt or
withhold P. R. were controlled according to the speaker by "middle
class parties" which, he predicted, "will make use of proportional
representation only where they expect to benefit at the expense of
the Social Democrats. Only where the middle class parties are in
the minority in industrial court elections, only where they fail to
benefit from the existing electoral system will they utilize proportional representation."4
Experience with the optional P. R. provision bore out the
speaker's prediction. The official publication of the industrial
courts, Das Gewerbegericht, reported that
in many places the stimulus for the establishment of proportional representation has come from the groups which
are unrepresented under the old system. Thus the Catholics
in Munich and Gmiind, the Evangelical Workmen's Union
in Potsdam, the workmen's secretary of the Christian Trade
Union in Mannheim have petitioned the city council [for
P. R.]5
Social Democratic majorities presumably were present in each case.
That P. R. was used principally as a weapon against the party in
industrial courts was revealed in the writings of its publicists and
in the resolutions of affiliated trade unions. Although nonsocialist
unions generally expressed approval of the optional P. R. provision,
the latter condemned it strongly.6 A resolution drafted by a trade
union conference in Mainz in 1903 reflected the socialist experience:
In consideration that the system of proportional representation is used by municipal authorities in industrial court
elections for the purpose of weakening the representation of
modern trade unions; in further consideration that the sys-
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tern of proportional representation still has not benefited a
workingmen's minority organized into a trade union, the assembly of cartel delegates, trade union directors, and workingmen industrial court members reject the present optional
system of proportional representation, which has been used
as a weapon in the class struggle against the modern workers'
movement.7
The utilization of P. R. against the Social Democrats in industrial courts placed them in an awkward position. 8 They had committed themselves to the principle of P. R. in the Erfurt Program in
1891 and had worked thereafter for the system's establishment for
elections to administrative and legislative bodies in Germany. The
first utilization of P. R. on a widespread scale, however, had proved
detrimental to their interests. They found themselves in the curious
position of advocating an electoral procedure which in the industrial
courts had become an antisocialist weapon in the hands of other
parties and groups. The development evidently caused some soulsearching among the socialists,9 but failed to produce articulate
opposition to P. R. "The fact," concluded one writer in 1909, "that
proportional representation could cost us mandates in a number of
social-political organizations cannot be decisive. It will be off-set
again by other gains."lO
Although the greater number of industrial courts retained the
majority systemp the 1901 amendment fostered considerable experimentation with P. R.12 Most of the courts which had adopted P.
R. by 1905 patterned their electoral laws after two drafts. One came
from the court in Frankfort a. M., where an unsuccessful attempt
had been made in 1895 to introduce P. R.13 The other was submitted in 1902 by the Prussian Ministry for Trade and Industry.14
The latter recommended a simple quota system whereby the number of deputies to be elected was divided into the total number
of votes cast and the resultant quotient was established for the
election of candidates. It also provided for so-called "open" lists.
The number of votes which each candidate received and not his
order of designation on the ticket determined his selection in the
allocation of seats. Several large cities and towns (Freiburg, Munich,
VIm) rejected such provisions, found in both the Frankfort and
Prussian drafts, and adopted "closed systems."15 Allocation of seats
within lists according to the latter followed the order in which the
party organization had designated the candidates. Closed lists hence
limited the choice of the voter. He could vote only for the party
ticket and not for the candidate.
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Experimentation with P. R. in various forms in industrial courts
undoubtedly contributed to its inclusion in 1904 in a law establishing mercantile courts (Kaufmannsgerichten) for merchants and
shopkeepers and their assistants and apprentices. 16 The courts were
made compulsory in all municipalities having more than 20,000
persons according to the last census. Their purpose was the same
as that of industrial courts, to function as unifying and moderating
agencies, and to decide on financial disputes between employers and
employees. Like the industrial courts, they were elected one-half by
the latter and one-half by the former. A bill submitted by the
government incorporated the optional P. R. provision of the industrial court law. The Reichstag committee which considered
the bill, however, voted to substitute compulsory P. R. for all mercantile court elections,l7 Members of the committee declared that
experience with the system in industrial courts merited its extension.
One member pointed out that a conference of representatives of
federal industrial courts meeting at Leipzig had declared by "overwhelming majority" for compulsory P. R. Although the government's representatives emphasized a lack of experience with the
system in Germany, the committee was almost unanimous in its
approval of the compulsory P. R. provision. The decision was upheld by the Reichstag in its final reading of the bill,1s
The decision reflected the importance of political considerations
in determining party attitudes toward P. R. Optional provisions
were introduced by nonsocialist parties for elections to industrial
courts in order to undermine socialist positions of power. Optionality was another matter, however, when applied to elections to
mercantile courts. There the influence of the socialists, who drew
the bulk of their support from among industrial workers, would be
almost negligible. To grant local authorities power to withhold or
extend P. R. would not greatly affect the representation of socialist
interests. The power might be used, however, to the disadvantage
of other groups. Progressives in control of some municipalities, for
example, might use P. R. against Centrist representation on the
courts, only to experience the same treatment in municipalities
controlled by the Center. The minority parties which comprised the
Reichstag majority hence favored compulsory P. R. as a means of
guaranteeing representation to affiliated minority groups in the
mercantile courts.
Among the 218 courts which were established by the mercantile
court law, 61 adopted "closed" list systems of P. R., 48 chose
"open" lists, and the remainder attempted to combine the two
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systems. 19 Those in the first category restricted the choice of the
voter to the ticket as presented by the party, seat allocations proceeding in order from the top to the bottom of the list of candidates.
The systems in the second category left the voter free to choose a
candidate, those with the most votes receiving the seats allotted to
the party ticket. The remaining 109 courts adopted list systems
which may be described as closed in the relative sense. The voter
could cast his ballot for the entire party list, or could designate
the candidate of his preference. If a majority of the voters for any
given ticket expressed candidate preferences, then seat allocations
proceeded according to the number of votes which each candidate
received. If a majority of the lists were unchanged, then allocation
proceeded according to the order of designation. While most
courts merely copied the electoral laws of near-by industrial courts,
some experimentation took place. The Prussian Ministry for
Trade and Industry again published a sample electoral law for
mercantile courts similar to the one which it had published for industrial courts in 1902.20
Partisan motives also brought the adoption of P. R. in 19041905 for elections to Prussian mining councils. The councils were
established in every mine employing at least one hundred persons
for the purpose of harmonizing relations between employers and
workers. After considerable discussion and division on the question,
the commission of the House of Deputies investigating the government's bill amended the latter to permit P. R. for council elections.
Instrumental to the House's approval was the consideration that
P. R. in the councils would eliminate the complete domination
there of the socialists. 21
One of the hardest blows dealt the socialist movement in Germany was the introduction of P. R. in the area of social insurance.
According to the Sickness Insurance Act of 1883, all workers regularly employed in factories, mines, quarries, and other industrial concerns were granted full medical and surgical benefits and limited
sick pay. Employees such as overseers, engineers, shop assistants,
etc., in the above industries as well as those in the postal and telegraphic services also were covered. 22 The funds, provided one-third
by the employers and two-thirds by the insured, were administered
by a number of agencies, depending on the type of industrial enterprise. Separate ones were established for those represented by
guilds, for mining, for construction, for large industries employing
more than fifty persons, for all municipalities containing at least
100 workers affected by the law, and for persons not included in
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any of the foregoing categories. By 1905 almost 12,000,000 persons
belonged to more than 24,000 agencies. Slightly more than one-half
the membership was concentrated in the Ortskrankenkassen} the
local municipal offices listed above in the fifth category.23 With the
exception of those agencies in the sixth or last category, which were
controlled by local municipal authorities, executive offices or
boards for the administration of local funds were elected by the
employers and the insured in proportion to their contributions,
viz., one-third and two-thirds, respectively. The agencies were
granted considerable autonomy in determining the amounts paid to
members, being able, for example, to extend or restrict benefits,
depending upon their interpretation of the member's need. 24
The local insurance agencies, in particular the Ortskrankenkassen} came to be controlled extensively by the Social Democrats. As
the strongest group among the workers, they usually were able to
win majorities in elections to the agencies. Since the latter were
composed one-third by employers and two-thirds by the insured,
the socialists could win majorities even without capturing all the
worker representation. Their control became significant in view of
the above-mentioned autonomy enjoyed by the local agencies in
determining insurance benefits. As revealed by debates in the
Reichstag over insurance legislation in 1911, the Social Democrats
were not slow to use their positions in the local agencies to the
disadvantage of nonsocialist groups. The Conservative leader,
Count von Westarp, alleged, for example, that salaried employees
who wished to receive full insurance benefits were forced into
organizations friendly to the Social Democrats. So great was the
socialist control of local insurance agencies that von Westarp could
designate the latter, the trade unions, and the party organization as
the "three props" of "the Social Democratic power-position" in
Germany.25
Nonsocialist parties in the Reichstag destroyed one prop by passing the National Insurance Act of 1911. In addition to extending
the scope of sickness, accident, and invalid insurance, the Act also
reorganized and centralized the administrative machinery. In place
of the former local sickness insurance agencies controlled by the
Social Democrats, new ones were created which administered all
types of insurance covered by the Act. The new agencies were
elected, not according to the former ratio of one-third by employers and two-thirds by the insured, but one-half by each. In
place of the majority and plurality systems which had been used
previously, P. R. was prescribed for all elections. Higher insurance
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boards, or courts of appeal, were similarly composed, with P. R.,
however, required only for the election of worker members. The
system also applied only for the election of worker members of the
highest organ, the Imperial Insurance Office. 26
The National Insurance Act thus removed the basis for Social
Democratic domination of local insurance administration. The
new employer-worker ratio in the local insurance offices and the
introduction of P. R. for the election of worker members removed
the possibility of socialist majorities. Although denying that local
insurance agencies were, as von Westarp claimed, one of the "props"
of Social Democracy, party speakers denounced the Act not only as
a denial of the right of the insured to administer local insurance
funds, but also as an attack upon the socialist movement. Their
bitterness was illustrated by the attitude expressed toward the introduction of P. R. "When you are in the minority, you bring out
your proposals for the introduction of proportional representation,"
a party spokesman snapped at a heckler during the Reichstag debate.
"When you are in the majority, you forget all about introducing
it."27
A case in point for the speaker was the Hamburg electoral law
of 1906, one of the most striking uses of P. R. against the Social
Democrats during the Second Reich. Prior to 1906 one-half the
total membership of the lower house (80 deputies) was elected in
districts under the majority system by persons whose taxed incomes
had exceeded 1,200 marks for five consecutive years; the remaining
one-half was chosen by a restricted category of administrative
officials and former members of the upper house, the Senate. In
1906 the tax requirement for the first one-half was raised so that
voters in the 1,200 to 2,500 range elected 48 deputies, and those
above 2,500 marks elected 24. All 72 deputies were elected at large
by P. R., with the remaining eight chosen in districts by the
majority system.28
The reform came in response to Social Democratic gains in the
taxed-income category. By 1904 more than 90 per cent of the
voters within this category went to the polls to cast more than 70
per cent of their ballots for the socialists. The electoral law consequently was changed to avert Social Democratic control of onehalf the membership of the lower house. The introduction of
P. R. in the lower income category extended representation to nonsocialist minorities formerly outvoted by Social Democatic majorities. The latter also lost representation with the removal of
24 deputies to the upper income category.
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Minority parties benefited further from the kind of P. R. established for elections in the taxed-income category. According to the
new law, alliances could be declared among parties prior to the
election. Each alliance counted in the allocation of seats as one
list. Minority groups without much chance of electing candidates
singly thus could combine lists and elect candidates. As a majority
party in the lower income classification, and as a party which traditionally refrained from electoral alliances with other parties, the
socialists hence suffered from the P. R. provisions of the Hamburg
electoral law.
The socialists also were handicapped by provisions of the Hamburg law governing the allocation of seats within lists. Although
parties presented lists of candidates for election, the voter was not
restricted to a choice among parties in casting his several ballots.29
He could cast all for one candidate, or could distribute them among
several persons on a number of lists. Seats allotted to each party
ticket were distributed among the candidates with the most votes.
Party organizations thus had no means to insure the election of
preferred candidates. Loyal workers placed at the top of the list
might be bypassed by the voter for popular and perhaps less docile
candidates further down the list. Open list provisions of this description were particularly harmful to strongly organized groups like
the Social Democratic party, which exerted a rigid discipline over
the views and votes of deputies in representative assemblies.
Similar to the Hamburg law was the reform of the Wiirttemberg
law for elections to the second chamber, which also appeared in
1906.30 The law transferred to the upper chamber 23 deputies
elected by privileged groups (thirteen from the nobility, six from
the Evangelical Church, three from the Catholic Church, and one
from the University) and substituted 17 deputies to be chosen by
the electorate in two large districts. The law also increased the
number of deputies elected from Stuttgart from one to six. The
total membership of the second chamber (91) hence remained the
same. The 23 new deputies were to be elected by a P. R. system
similar to that found in the Hamburg electoral law. Voters could
cast several ballots, all for one candidate or could distribute them
among several on lists presented by different parties. 3 ! The latter
could present lists either singly or in combination with others. A
similar system was established in 1906 for elections in municipalities
with more than 10,000 inhabitants.32
The socialists attempted without success during the debates of
the Wiirttemberg second chamber on the electoral reform bill to
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extend P. R. for elections to the entire chamber. Other parties
favored P. R., but only for Social Democratic strongholds where
the} were in the minority. Although the socialists eventually joined
with the German party and the People's party to vote P. R. for
the election of the 23 new deputies, they did so reluctantly. As one
party spokesman complained,
the Wiirttemberg government introduces the system of pro·
portional representation in order to prevent the "suppression of intelligent minorities by numerical majorities," in
order "to counter-balance the vast strength of the masses."
At the same time, however, the middle classes reject the
Social Democratic proposal to introduce proportional representation for elections to all seats. 33
In elections the same year (1906) to the lower chamber in
Wiirttemberg, the newly created seats were distributed as folIows: 34
Party

Social Democratic Party
German Party
People's Party
Conservative Party
Center Party

Stuttgart
Votes
Seats

117,136
59,315
36,081
16,527
14,551

3
I

1
I

0

Neckar and
Jagst
District
Votes

508,420
200,275
4.55,180
370,021
270,687

Donau and
Schwarzwald
District
Votes

230,331
155,325
314,762
160,200
599,401

Combined
Seats

4
2
4
3
4

It would appear that the Center party received more votes than
the Social Democrats, yet won fewer seats. The figures are misleading, however, for voters in Stuttgart were allowed six votes apiece
and voters in the other two districts were allowed eight and nine
votes respectively. Vote totals for Stuttgart hence should be increased by one-third for an approximate picture of the proportional
vote relationships among the three districts. By comparison with
other parties in the elections, however, the Center still fared badly,
receiving in the three districts as a whole proportionally less seats
in relation to the total number of votes than any other party. In
Stuttgart the socialists received three of the six seats. Had the
city been divided into equal electoral districts and the majority
system retained, the Social Democrats probably would have won
all six seats. 35 The party would have acquired four seats in the
election had the Center and Conservative parties not utilized the
combined list provisions of the electoral law to return an additional
Conservative deputy.3u
Political parties in Bavaria soon discovered in P. R. an effective
weapon for use against the socialists in municipal elections. The
Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution in February, 1908, calling
for P. R. in all municipalities with more than 4,000 inhabitants,

Experimentation with P. R. /

41

and recommending further that the system be extended to municipalities below 4,000 upon petition of one-fifth of the qualified
voters. 37 The Bavarian government returned a bill the following
June embodying the first recommendation, but not the second. The
bill passed both chambers and became law on August 15, 1908.38
Eighty-five of the approximately 115 municipalities in Bavaria
were affected by the law. An election of municipal deputies
(Gemeindebevollmiichtigen) held the same year under the new law
produced the following percentage results: 39
Votes

Liberal
Social Democrat
Center
Local groups
Economic and social groups
Unaffiliated
Allied parties and groups

38.7
28.8
19.4
4.1
7.3
0.5
2.2

Deputies

30.0
9.2
22.8
25.3
4.2
0.3
8.2

Differences among the two groups of percentages were striking for
the socialists, who received more than one-fourth of the total vote,
yet won less than one-tenth of the contests. The disparity was
greatest in favor of local groups, with the deputy percentage being
approximately six times greater than that representing the total
number of votes polled.
Several factors contributed to the disparities. The socialists
were most heavily concentrated in large urban municipalities with
more than 100,000 inhabitants, where the ratio of voters to elected
officials exceeded that for town and rural areas. Local groups, on
the other hand, were strongest in the latter, and hence could elect
more deputies with less votes than the socialists.40 Certain provisions of the electoral law also worked to the disadvantage of
the socialists. Like the Hamburg and Wiirttemberg laws, the one
for Bavaria gave the voter practically unlimited freedom in the
choice of candidates. He could distribute his several votes among
candidates on different party lists if he wished to do, so. He could
even write in the names of individuals not found on the official
lists. Such freedom of selection enjoyed by the voter undoubtedly
increased the number of contests won by independent candidates.
Provisions allowing parties to combine lists also contributed to disparities among deputy and seat percentages. Such combinations
elected 97 deputies with 2.2 per cent of the total vote, whereas the
socialists received 109 with 28.8 per cent. The Center and liberal
parties and a number of local groups participated in the combinations, their deputy and vote percentages being consequently higher
than revealed by the returns,41
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P. R. appeared frequently in the consideration of electoral reform in Baden. As early as 1869 the second chamber debated and
rejected the system.42 Although the chamber in 1894 passed by
large majority a left-liberal proposal for P. R., the government rejected the system on the grounds that local interests would not
receive adequate expression. 43 P. R. was not established in Baden
until 1910, and then only for municipal elections. According to the
electoral reform of that year, the system was introduced for elections in all municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants. The
law combined a closed list system with the established three-class
system of voting. 44 Although the war temporarily postponed further
consideration of P. R. for legislative elections in Baden,45 reform
proposals began to appear late in 1917. The liberals joined with the
socialists to petition for universal P. R. in the second chamber, and
the Center proposed P. R. for large city districts. 46 The government rejected universal P. R., but declared through a spokesman
early in 1918 that revision of the electoral system in large cities
would be permitted. The reform was not inaugurated before the
end of the Reich.
The development toward P. R. in Baden prior to 1918 was
paralleled in other states. Oldenburg and Lubeck adopted the system
for municipal elections in 1907 and 1908 respectively. The liberal
and Center parties in Alsace-Lorraine attempted unsuccessfully to
introduce P. R. for municipal elections.47 A resolution by the
second chamber in Saxony in 1908 for P. R. for the election of part
of its membenhip was thwarted the following year by the opposition
of the first chamber.48 After lengthy debate and despite the support of the Social Democrats, Progressives, and National Liberals,
P. R. was rejected in 1917 in the Saxon second chamber largely in
consequence of the government's opposition. As reported by one
observer, "the government had declared against turning the
state over to the masses [i.e., the industrial workers]. That would
be an injustice to the educated citizenry and the peasants."49 The
second chamber reversed itself the following year, however, and
adopted a resolution presented by the National Liberals calling for
universal P. R. with plural voting. 50 The fall of the Reich intervened before further action could be taken.
In Prussia in 1918 the resurgent demand to abolish the threeclass system of voting was again rejected by the Lower House. The
debate produced a compromise proposal, however, which included
the introduction of P. R. in several mixed-language districts in
East Prussia containing Polish majorities. Despite endorsement by
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the Lower House, the proposal was rejected by the Prussian government. 51 In Bavaria the liberals and the socialists sought unsuccessfully prior to 1918 to secure the adoption of universal P. R. for
La'ndtag elections. A resolution to that effect was rejected in 1917
by agricultural groups and the Center. Universal P. R. presumably
would have reduced the number of rural representatives in the
House. 52 In June, 1918, the Landtag rejected a similar resolution
by the liberals and socialists. One by the Center party calling for
P. R. in five large cities was accepted, but no reform was enacted
before the collapse of the Reich a few months later. 53
Only in one instance was P. R. introduced in federal and state
legislation enacted during the war. A Civilian Service Law passed
in 1916 compelled all German men between the ages of seventeen
and sixty to take employment in certain occupations considered
vital to the war effort. 54 Committees of workers in the various occupations were established in all industries directly affected by the
law and in all those which employed at least 50 workers. The committees were elected by P. R. To serve as media for the expression
of workers' complaints, their purpose was essentially to harmonize
relations between management and labor. Presumably the purpose
was aided by assuring, through proportional elections, an adequate
representation of nonsocialist minorities.
Opponents of the socialist movement in Germany thus found
in P. R. an instrument useful in the struggle for power. To combat
the increasing representation of Social Democrats in state legislatures, the system could be extended to urban districts where their
voting strengths were most heavily concentrated. To undermine
socialist domination of the workers' movement in Germany, it could
be used in elections to the numerous bodies which had arisen with
social and factory legislation. The effectiveness of P. R. for such
purposes was enhanced by the numerous refinements to which it lent
itself. "Open" lists and plural voting offered the worker an opportunity to distribute his votes among both socialist and opposing
candidates, thus endangering the "disciplined" vote sought by
socialists. Combined list provisions made it possible for minority
groups without chance of electoral success singly to elect candidates
at the expense of the socialists, who usually refrained or were
excluded from such alliances. In these and numerous other ways
the suffrage justified by its proponents as the most democratic in
existence was used by entrenched social and political groups against
a movement which had as its ultimate purpose the democratization
and socialization of the Reich.
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population changes during the Second Reich underlay the demand for electoral reform in the Reichstag. Although
an approximate equality had been established in 1871 among
the Reichstag's electoral districts,! rural areas during the ensuing
decades lost thousands of voters to the urban districts. By 1912
approximately one-half of the districts had less than the over-all
average of 36,000 voters, while several had accumulated more than
100,000, one even exceeding 300,000. 2 Despite the presence of such
inequalities, each district continued to elect one deputy apiece to
the Reichstag.
The demand for redistricting came chiefly from those parties
which were underrepresented by the existing electoral arrangement.
The Social Democrats were heavily concentrated in the large urban
districts, and hence led the demand for reform. The Progressives,
representing the commercial and intellectual middle classes, also
were strongest in the cities and favored a redistribution of districts. 3 The National Liberals, drawing their support chiefly from
business and heavy industry, likewise elected the greatest share of
their deputies in the Reichstag from the urban districts. Since any
redistribution in favor of the latter would increase Social Democratic strength in the Reichstag, however, they were extremely
reluctant to tamper with the existing arrangement.
Rural interests within the Center and Conservative parties led
the opposition to redistricting. Although the Center, as the party
of Catholicism in Germany, included within its membership representatives of all social and economic groups in both town and country, agrarian interests held the ascendancy. Spokesmen for the party
in the Reichstag hence opposed any change in the election system
which might reduce the representation of rural areas, especially
since an extension of representation in the industrial areas would
increase the number of Social Democratic deputies.4 Most vociferous
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was the opposition of the Conservatives, whose voting strength lay
almost entirely in the agrarian districts. As representatives of the
conservative regime which dominated Germany throughout the
Second Reich, they became almost hysterical in denouncing any and
all attempts to alter the constitution. Spokesmen in the Reichstag
were emphatic in rejecting any plan for redistricting which would
decrease the number of deputies elected from agrarian districts to
the advantage of the Social Democrats concentrated in the urban
districts. "We do not want that," asserted one Conservative in 1903
on the floor of the Reichstag. "Neither can we allow it to happen."5
The elections of 1912 gave fresh impetus to agitation for reform
of the electoral law for the Reichstag. All the major parties lost
seats to the Social Democrats, whose representation to the Reichstag
rose from 43 to 110. The losses were particularly disturbing to the
National Liberal and Progressive parties, for each received more
votes in 1912 than in 1907. 6 The National Liberal percentage of the
total vote in 1912 declined only slightly (6.2 per cent) from that in
1907, and that of the Progressive party for the same years increased
substantially (17.9 per cent). Yet the two parties lost nine and
seven seats, respectively, in 1912.
The losses were attributed principally to the functioning of the
electoral law. Candidates were elected in single-member districts,
with a majority of the votes required for election. When none
received a majority, second or runoff elections were held between
the two with the most votes. The National Liberals fared badly in
the first elections in 1912, losing majorities in 15 districts and
emerging with only four seats. Even more disturbing was the experience of the Progressives, who lost majorities formerly held in
12 districts and emerged without a single seatP In subsequent
elections in districts where no candidate had received a majority
in the first balloting, the National Liberals and Progressives received 41 and 42 seats, respectively. Each party hence was dependent
upon the unpredictable runoff elections for the maintenance of its
political power in the Reichstag. Each was a minority party within
the existing arrangement of districts and might be expected to look
with favor upon any system of minority representation.
Agitation for P. R. accordingly developed within both parties
immediately following the election. s The National Liberals declared in the Reichstag their readiness to adopt P. R. for the large
industrial districts. 9 The Progressives followed by advocating universal P. R. for Reichstag elections.1° Even the distinguished Progressive leader, Friedrich Naumann, temporarily dropped his opposition
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to P. R. and concluded reluctantly in the Progressive organ, Die
Hilfe, that "the outcome of the election now compels us to work
strongly and persistently for proportional representation."ll The
Progressives joined with the Social Democrats in the Reichstag in
1913 in an attempt to establish universal P. R. for Reichstag elections. The Social Democrats at that time attempted to capitalize
on National Liberal discontent with the existing system. One spokesman for the party asserted during the debate:
The complaint often has been heard especially from the
ranks of the National Liberals that sufficient representation
of industry and trade in the Reichstag cannot be obtained.
They have complained, for example, that Hamburg had
three Social Democratic deputies, while the liberals were not
represented. Certainly, gentlemen, I grant without question
that it is unjust that strong minorities held by the individual
parties in many electoral districts remain entirely without
representation. .,. I should think, therefore, that this party
[the National Liberal] in particular had all the necessary
inducement to consider carefully the proportional electoral
system and the redistribution of electoral dIstricts. The liberal
parties could acquire considerably more power in the German
Reich than they have today if they worked diligently for a
better electoralsystem.1 2
The Social Democratic appeal almost worked. The resolution for
universal P. R. was defeated by one vote. 13
Although the war for a time postponed further agitation for
electoral reform and P. R. for the Reichstag, Germany's internal
divisions eventually shattered the Bttrgfrieden and forced reconsideration of such questions. The existing power divisions within
the Reich and the individual states, particularly Prussia, failed to
reflect the economic and political developments of a swiftly industrializing state. 14 Most of the parties were discontented with a
political system which failed to accord them full participation in
the direction of public affairs. The government's new poley of conciliation toward the Social Democrats only temporarily quieted the
general discontent of the largest single party in the Reichstag. By
1917 the Progressive and National Liberal parties joined with the
Social Democrats to demand the creation of a special committee
for the consideration of constitutional reform. The resolution was
adopted in the Reichstag on March 30 by a majority of 228 to 33.
At the initiative of the Progressives, an interparty committee was
formed on July 6 among the Progressive, National Liberal, Social
Democratic, and Center parties of the Reichstag for the purpose of
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fostering unammity on questions of internal political reform. 15
The committe's deliberations soon extended to foreign policy and
produced the July Peace Proposal. Asserting that Germany was
fighting a defensive war, the proposal called for a "peace of understanding" and the rejection of all plans for territorial annexation
and "political, economic, and financial oppression." 16 It was
adopted by a majority composed of Social Democrats, Centrists, and
Progressives. Although the National Liberals withheld their support of the proposal and withdrew from the interparty committee,
they joined with the majority parties in demanding universal
suffrage for Prussia and parliamentarization of the Reich.
In its first report to the Reichstag the Constitutional Committee
recommended an increase in the number of seats in the Reichstag
and the establishment of P. R. in the large industrial districts. The
recommendation was debated and adopted by the Reichstag on
July 6, 1917; a Social Democratic resolution calling for universal
P. R. was voted down. Both were rejected by the Conservatives.
Although they had polled slight minorities in several of the large
industrial districts in the elections of 1912,11 an increased representation was unlikely. As members of a party which benefited
from the existing division of electoral districts, they feared that
the action might lead to P. R.'s extension throughout the Reich.
The Center and National Liberal parties supported the committee's resolution and rejected the Social Democratic proposal. The
Progressive Party likewise supported the resolution, but indicated
its willingness to consider universal P. R. should experimentation
with the system in the large industrial districts prove satisfactory.
All three had polled sizeable totals in 1912 in several of the large
districts, and could expect substantial gains. 18
The resolution for P. R. in the large industrial districts confronted the Social Democrats with the same problem which had
accompanied the introduction of P. R. in other areas in Germany.19
Again the system would be introduced where their voting strength
was most heavily concentrated. The Majority Socialists accepted
the reform proposal reluctantly with the hope that P. R., once
established, eventually would displace the majority system entirely.
The Independent Socialists rejected anything short of universal
P.R.
In response to the Reichstag's action on the Committee proposal,
the Reich government submitted a suffrage reform bill to the
Reichstag on February 16, 1918. According to its provisions, the
membership of the Reichstag was to be raised from 397 to 441.
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Thirty-six large single-member districts were to be reorganized and
accorded 80 deputies, all of which were to be elected by a system of
P. R. with open lists and the d'Hondt method of allocation. 2o Of
the 36 districts to be reorganized, 27 had returned Social Democratic
deputies in the election of 1912, two National Liberal, two Polish,
one Progressive, and four Centrist. A reallocation of seats in the
new districts on the basis of the 1912 election statistics and the
d'Hondt method would have given the Social Democrats roughly
50 and the Poles two, with the remaining 28 distributed somewhat
equally among the Progressives, Centrists, and National Liberals. 21
The Social Democratic gain hence would have been approximately
equal to that of the combined gains of the other parties.
By February, 1918, the relationship between the Reichstag and
the federal government had shifted. The resignation of Chancellor
Michaelis had been forced by the Reichstag in October. His successor, Count Hertling, first conferred with the Reichstag majority
and agreed upon basic policy before accepting the chancellorship.22
The appointment of Friedrich von Payer as Vice-Chancellor placed
in the Chancellery a leading Reichstag advocate of parliamentary
government for the Reich. That the former chairman of the
Reichstag majority's interparty committee used his new position
in the interests of suffrage reform and P. R. was reflected in his
statements as official spokesman for the government in the Reichstag.
During a speech to the Reichstag on February 25, 1918, von
Payer referred to the electoral reform bill and the opportunity
which it presented for experimentation with P. R.23 The Conservatives assailed the reference immediately on the grounds that
it contradicted the government's declaration in the bill's preamble
against the extension of P. R. to the remaining districts of the
Reich. 24 During the sessions of the Constitutional Committee from
March through June, the Conservative members repeatedly denounced von Payer's speech and challenged representatives of the
government to state the latter's real position on the extension of
P. R.25 Reference to the statement in the bill's preamble failed to
mollify them. As a remonstrance against von Payer, they even
withheld their vote in committee on a Social Democratic proposal
calling for universal P. R.26
The Conservatives renewed their attack upon von Payer when
the reform bill appeared before the Reichstag on July 8 for its
second reading. A sharp exchange occurred between the ViceChancellor and the Conservative leader, Count von Westarp, dur-
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ing the debate.27 Von Westarp repeatedly challenged von Payer
to affirm the government's unalterable opposition to the extension
of P. R. to other electoral districts. Von Payer merely replied that
the government was not presently contemplating the extension of
the system. His statements indicated the effect of his own sympathies
with P. R.28 upon the government's policy with regard to the system.
They stood in contrast with the government's failure even to mention P. R. in the presentation of its views to the Reichstag the
preceding year (July 6, 1917) on the first report of the Constitutional
Committee. 21l A National Liberal speaker had concluded during
the subsequent debate that the omission implied the government's
opposition to the system's inclusion in the Committee's recommendation. No clarifying statement had been made by the government's representative, Dr. Helferrich. 30
The Conservatives were especially disturbed by an amendment
voted by the Progressive, Social Democratic, and National Liberal
members of the committee of the Reichstag which considered the
reform bill. The amendment called for automatic extensions of the
mandate and P. R. in those districts which experienced large population growths in the future. Each district would receive an additional deputy for each new unit of 200,000 inhabitants when the
population exceeded 300,000.31 Although the amendment probably
would have affected very few electoral districts, it was significant as
a commitment by the Reichstag to the principle of P. R.'s automatic
extension.
The Conservatives rejected the entire reform bill, which included the automatic P. R. amendment, on the grounds that it
would benefit the industrial districts and the socialists. A party
spokesman asserted in the July 8 debate that the bill
signifies an important gain for the urban population and
especially for the organized industrial workers. The unrestricted numerical principle will lead, indeed, to class
domination by the industrial working class. Thus the Social
Democrats will benefit most from this law; and above all, the
industrial consumer groups of the large cities will be
strengthened in the Reichstag. 32
Any shift in the balance of political power from rural to urban
districts, whether by means of P. R. or by redistricting with the
majority system, would have reduced Conservative strength in the
Reichstag. The party had remained predominantly rural in composition and could have expected no gains in industrial areas under
P.R.
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The Conservatives, to be sure, had favored P. R. for elections
to boards for the administration of social insurance and in other
areas as a weapon against the socialists. As reflected in contemporary
literature calling for electoral reform, many even were willing to
introduce proportional voting in combination with occupational
representation and other devices for restricting expression in the
Reichstag of the growing urban population.33 The use of proportional elections without such safeguards, however, was another
matter. Once substituted for the majority system in the industrial
districts, P. R. as embodied in the reform bill might easily be extended in the same form to the remaining districts. For this reason
the Conservatives opposed the reform bill from beginning to end
and attacked the Vice-Chancellor, von Payer, so persistently for his
sympathies with an electoral system which they feared.
The same unwillingness to alter the antiquated representation
ratio between industrial and agrarian areas characterized the
attitude of the Center. One party spokesman asserted in the July 8
debate that the automatic P. R. amendment would lead to a "onesided advantage of the large industrial electoral districts at the
expense of the remaining electoral districts."34 Although the
Center opposed the amendment largely for this reason both in
committee and on the floor of the Reichstag, the party did not
reject the entire bill. It joined the Progressives, Social Democrats,
and National Liberals to pass the bill as amended. The Center
thus compromised its opposition to universal P. R., first by approving the system for the large industrial districts affected by the
reform bill, and then by accepting the amended bill with the
automatic P. R. provision. Tempted by the prospect of increased
political power through extensions of the mandate and P. R. to the
urban areas, the Center gradually abandoned the majority system
which, along with an unequal distribution of electoral districts,
long had accorded the party representation in excess of proportionate voting strength. The party certainly was aware that it
would lose seats in the Reichstag if universal P. R. were established,
for it consistently had received seats in excess of the percentage of
votes polled. 35 There was no indication at that time, however,
that a P. R. system establishing full proportionality might be
adopted by the Reichstag parties. The latter had given their
approval to the d'Hondt system contained in the reform bill, and
that system favored parties which were geographically concentrated. 36 The Center therefore could expect that the initial losses
under any future system of P. R. for elections to the Reichstag might
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not be as high as one·fourth of its representation.3T The party also
could expect to extend itself in those areas where it had been denied
representation as a minority group under the majority system, and
hence could strengthen its appeal to Catholic working groups.
The Center's shift toward P. R. in 1918 illustrated the force
of the movement for universal P. R. by the parties of the political
left. A Progressive member of the Reichstag, himself critical of the
reform bill and its P. R. provisions, wrote in the Preussische Jahrbucher in June, 1918, that P. R. had received the sudden and almost
unanimous approval of the parties of the Reichstag:
. . . One gathered from the debates that almost all parties
suddenly were convinced of the advantages of the proportional principle as opp'osed to the majority system. Only the
Right voiced a noisy If somewhat superficial opposition....
Suddenly and quite recently an axiom had emerged.3s
The writer attributed the appearance of the new "axiom" to the
dominance of partisan political considerations:
One now encounters this point of view even in parliamentary
circles: Proportional representation may be detrimental and
questionable, but we must adopt it because certain political
ends can be attained thereby. To debate the defects and the
impossibilities of the law with men of such convictions really
serves no purpose.39
The dominance of partisan considerations in the attitudes of parties
in the Reichstag toward P. R. in 1918 was reflected in their substitution of closed list provisions for the open list system in the government's bill. The voter according to this system could designate the
candidate of his choice on the party ticket for which he cast his
ballot. If one· half the voters for a given ticket designated preferred
candidates, seats would be distributed among those with the most
votes. If one-half failed to do so, then the allocation would proceed
according to the sequence of candidates printed on the list. 40 The
provisions were deleted by the Reichstag in an amendment to the
government's bill. The voter was expressly denied the right to
choose candidates on party tickets by the stipulation that seat allocations within the latter were to proceed in order from the first to the
last candidate listed. i1 Since the party organizations which presented the tickets decided the sequences, the amendment strengthened party control of the choice of candidates. The Center opposed
the amendment as a restriction of the voter's freedom of expression.42 The Conservative party rejected it as an instrument of party
tyranny.43
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Although the National Liberal party was not a leader in the
movement of the Reichstag parties toward universal P. R. in 1918,
the party voted for the suffrage reform bill and for the automatic
P. R. provision. During the 1870's the party consistently had received representation in the Reichstag in excess of proportionate
voting strength. As the party suffered decline during the 1880's,
however, it had begun to receive fewer seats than its proportionate
voting strength. 44 In 1890 the National Liberals were jolted by the
outcome of Reichstag elections in Baden districts. In 1887 they had
received nine of the 14 Reichstag seats from Baden with approximately 44 per cent of the votes. In 1890 they received 32 per cent
of the votes and still constituted the largest single party in Baden,
but failed to secure a single seatl Other parties had combined against
them in the runoff elections. 45 The significance of the Baden experience for the party's future was reinforced by the elections of 1912,
described above. After 1912 the National Liberals were painfully
aware of their position as a minority party dependent upon the
unpredictable runoff elections for representation in the Reichstag.
"It is ... characteristic of our party," concluded one member writing in 1917, "that more and more our old original seats are overrun,
that party splintering has made the National Liberal as well as
other liberal parties dependent upon the runoff election for the
greatest number of their mandates."46 Universal P. R. might not
achieve a large increase in representation, but at least it seemed
to assure the party's continued representation in the Reichstag.
The Progressives were divided in 1917-1918 on the question of
universal P. R. for elections to the Reichtag. Their failure to retain a majority of the votes in any district in the election of 1912
had contributed to demands for P. R. Although the system had
become a part of the Progressive program, it had not been pushed
by the party's leaders.47 One of the strongest leaders, Friedrich
Naumann, even opposed the system. Since P. R. ideally affords expression to all shades of opinion within the electorate, Naumann
believed it would destroy Germany's chances for a two-party system,
which he regarded as requisite to parliamentary government. 48
Other elements within the Progressive party, however, were less
concerned with a two-party system and parliamentary government
than with their party's immediate future. They believed that P. R.
would increase their membership in the Reichstag. 49 According to
one Progressive propagandizing for P. R. in a National Liberal
publication, the system would bring "a certain win" of 23 seats for
liberals in the Reichstag. Not least important, the writer claimed,
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would be "the protection of such electoral districts as Bochum, Duisburg, Saarbriicken, and Leipzig, which certainly are gravely threatened at the present time."50 The pressure of discontented Progressives led the party in 1917-1918 to sponsor the petition for P. R.
for large industrial districts and the amendment for the system's
automatic extension. The party then united with the Social Democratic, National Liberal, and Center parties on November 8, 1918,
to petition for universal P. R.51
An important factor which underlay acceptance of P. R. by the
parties of the political left and center was the pressure of local
groups, particularly trade unions, for increased representation of
their interests in the Reichstag. One union spokesman writing in
1909 pointed out that "the Center from 1877 to 1907 had one worker
in the Reichstag.... "52 According to the writer, the Center, under
pressure from the workers, nominated a number of worker candidates for election to the Reichstag in 1907. "In several electoral
districts, like Osnabriick and Saarbriicken," however, "the radical
worker candidates were withdrawn at the last moment due to the
objection of the 'better' Centrist people. Lawyers [Justizriite]
were substituted for the workers."53 Nonsocialist unions also were
irritated by the number of representatives of socialist unions
elected to the Reichstag. In 1912, for example, there were 26 representatives of the latter in the Reichstag, and only seven and two
representatives, respectively, of the Christian and independent trade
unions. 54 The views of one union leader in 1918 illustrated the
pressure of nonsocialist unions upon the parties for the introduction
of P. R. as a means to increase their representation in the Reichstag.
Pointing to an increasing difficulty of electing trade union representatives in urban districts as a result of the socialist upsurge, the
writer concluded:
The members of the Christian-national workers' movement
wish to remain true to the parties with which they have been
associated, but they wish better representation within these
parties . . . . They wish approximate proportionality with
other groups in the allocation of mandates. The previous
treatment accorded our movement in this respect is to be
attributed less readily to the middle class parties themselves
than to the electoral system with its majority principle. A
new means must be found. That means is proportional representation, which will provide representatives to the middleclass parties in those electoral districts in which they previously failed or no longer are able to elect their candidates. 55
The middle classes also voiced disappointment with the existing
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electoral system. The workers, one Progressive complained in 1913,
were represented exclusively in predominantly industrial districts.
Even in "mixed" industrial and agricultural districts, manufacturers, merchants, hand workers, etc., were seldom elected. "Proportional representation," he concluded, "would completely exclude these abuses, for it guarantees representation to the minority."116
It is strange that the Social Democrats continued to advocate
P. R. after 1912. By 1890 they polled more votes than any other
single party; the popular vote for the party continued to rise
steadily. By 1912 the Social Democrats were no longer spread thinly
throughout the country. They held strong majorities in most of
the large industrial districts, and had sizeable pluralities in many
other districts. By 1912 the Social Democrats would have benefited
more from redistricting and a plurality system than from universal
P. R. They received pluralities in 1912 in 144 electoral districts
and secured llO seats in the Reichstag. 1I7 A system of full proportionality would have allotted the party 134 seats on the basis
of the 1912 election statistics. Even without redistricting the party
thus would have benefited more from a plurality system than from
P.R.
The failure of the Social Democrats to reject P. R. has led one
writer in this country to conclude that they were motivated by
considerations of "justness" and "fairness."lIs The writer apparently has taken at face value the innumerable appeals to electoral
Gerechtigkeit which appeared after 1891 in almost every socialist
writing or speech about electoral systems. He has assumed further
that the Social Democrats realized that redistricting and the
plurality system would have benefited them more than P. R. The
conclusions of at least one contemporary among the socialists suggest
that the Social Democrats by 1912 were practically incapable of
considering electoral statistics objectively. Referring to the views of
"many middle-class publicists" that the majority system would one
day benefit the socialists to the detriment of the nonsocialists, the
writer concluded:
The time when the majority system will begin to benefit the
Social Democratic Party still seems quite distant. According
to A. Kolb there were 58 electoral districts in 1903, 53 in
1907,93 in 1912 in which Social Democratic voters comprised
over 40 per cent of the total number of voters. These districts thus can be regarded as socialist. According to the
[total] number of votes received [in all districts], however,
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the Social Democratic Party should have received 127 seats in
1903,83 in 1907, 138 in 1912 [SiC].1>9
The writer's use of electoral statistics reflected the typical socialist
approach. Electoral statistics had significance to the socialists only
insofar as they revealed the disparity between the percentage of
total votes polled and the percentage of seats held. It probably
never occurred to the above writer to count the number of districts
in which his party had secured pluralities. Had he done so, and
had he concluded in favor of a plurality system and rejected P. R.,
the evidence strongly suggests that his party would have ostracized
him. To the present writer's knowledge, there appeared between
1891 and 1918 only one publication by a socialist which criticized
P. R.; and significantly, this one appeared anonymously.60 The
author of the publication maintained that the Social Democrats
would benefit more from a redistribution of electoral districts in
Reichstag elections than from P. R. He referred to the socialist
agitation for P. R. as so much "fuss over nothing," and complained
that the system had come to be treated, even by 1895, as "a kind of
axiom."61 The views of another socialist writing in 1909 revealed
the anger of socialists over the use of P. R. to their disadvantage by
other parties.62 To maintain, however, that the party was com·
mitting "a sort of harakari" by advocating P. R. under such circumstances was not considered "expedient" by the writer. His
reason: "We could be criticized for not adhering to our principles."63
The complete lack of critical analysis of P. R. in relation to socialist
voting strength, even in face of the system's utilization to the party's
obvious disadvantage, suggests that the Social Democrats were not
motivated in their advocacy of P. R. primarily by considerations
of "justness" and "fairness." The Erfurt party congress in 1891
had decreed P. R. as the electoral arrangement most beneficial to
the party. Critical analysis of the system by socialists thereafter
ceased.
P. R. thus found acceptance in the Reichstag in 1917-1918. The
suffrage bill presented by the government in February, 1918, was
amended to include the automatic P. R. provision and passed its
third reading by the Reichstag on July 10, 1918. It became law on
August 24 of that year, died with the fall of the Reich in November,
and reappeared almost verbatim in the electoral law of the German
Republic.
That P. R. rather than a plan for redistricting was adopted by the
Reichstag in 1917-1918 may be attributed partly to the peculiarities
of the system's growth within Germany. It had been experimented
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with and adapted to eXIstmg electoral procedures (the majority
system, election by district, plural voting, etc.) for almost two
decades. The areas in which P. R. was employed-industrial and
mercantile courts, social insurance boards, workers' committees,
large urban districts-reveal the close connection between its growth
and Germany's industrialization. The system, moreover, had demonstrated its usefulness to the nonsocialist parties in areas where large
socialist majorities were present. All the major political parties
with the exception of the Conservatives had sought P. R. in various
states for Landtag elections in large industrial districts. That these
parties introduced P. R. for Reichstag elections in the large industrial districts was not surprising. They merely extended to the
Reich the solution they had long advocated for states with similar
population shifts arising from industrialization.
Even those like Friedrich Naumann who attempted to rise above
partisan politics doubted the practicality of redistricting alone as a
solution, and were attracted by P. R.'s supposed merits. Past experience in Bavaria and Alsace-Lorraine, Naumann stated in Die Hilfe
following the election of 1912, illustrated the tremendous difficulties
involved in redistricting. "A parliamentary majority never has
been able to free itself from partisan considerations when marking
off new districts." Highly significant was his second objection to
redistricting, that "our own experience has shown that population
growths invalidate any suffrage within 10 to 20 years."64 Naumann
concluded that P. R. and not redistricting was the solution to the
problem of district inequalities, for population increases under P. R.
merely would raise the quotient required for the election of a
Reichstag deputy.65 His conclusions reflected the effects of swift
population growths and shifts in pointing up the difficulties of
redistricting and contributing to P. R.'s acceptance.
The electoral system which had developed with Germany's industrialization thus emerged in 1917-1918 as the solution to electoral problems largely created by industralization. Redistricting
might rectify the adverse balance of rural over urban representation
in the Reichstag. Redistricting with retention of the majority system, however, would not accord seats in the Reichstag to the large
nonsocialist minorities in the industrial districts. P. R. found acceptance in the Reichstag in 1917-1918 largely because it appeared
to offer increased political power to the parties with large voting
strengths in these areas.
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1918, was a time of crisis for the old order in
Germany. Beginning in the north, with a mutiny on November 4 among the sailors at Kiel, revolts quickly spread
southward through the major towns and cities of the Reich to
Munich, where a group of Independent Socialists on November 8
expelled the Bavarian royal family and proclaimed a republic.
Kaiser Wilhelm abdicated the following day, and Philipp Scheidemann excitedly proclaimed the German Republic to the masses of
Berlin workers milling about the Reichstag building. Berlin Councils of Workers and Soldiers shortly convened to vest the powers of
provisional government in a Council of six socialist Commissars of
the People.
The Second Reich lay in ruins. The authority of the military
had vanished; the monarchy had ceased to exist. The bulwarks of
conservatism were gone. Political power was a monopoly of the
proletarians, organized into Councils led by the Social Democrats
and several left-wing socialist groups, principally the Independents
and the Spartacists.
Germany was stunned by the rapidity with which the conservative regime had collapsed. With minor exceptions, opposition to
the course of events was nonexistent. Prussian Junkers and the
industrial bourgeoisie remained quiet, although apprehensive. Resistance was impossible without the support of the monarchy and
the military. The bourgeoisie moved quickly, however, to forestall
the socialization of industry which appeared imminent. Within
days after the collapse of the Second Reich they concluded with
the trade unions a wage and hour agreement with significant concessions to collective bargaining. They and other middle-class
liberals and conservatives also raised a cry for the National Assembly,
which had been promised in an early decree by the provisional
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government. 1 Without representation in the new regime, and without power to force their entrance, they were helpless to influence
the course of events. Their only hope lay with an elected assembly
which would provide them voice and vote, and hence an opportunity
to protect their interests.
The significance of convening a National Assembly to the power
position of the Workers' Councils was not lost upon left-wing
socialists. "The political instruments of power," an Independent
Socialist declared on November 16, "are today in the hands of the
workers and soldiers. They must not give up this power. Were we
to convene the National Assembly at this time that would mean a
death sentence to the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. . . . The
National Assembly is the road to the rule of the bourgeoisie."2
The moderate, or Majority Socialists, however, favored an early
convening of the Assembly. Opposition to government had become
such a habit that they felt curiously embarrassed by their new position of power. A democratically elected assembly would free them
from sole responsibility for the common welfare. Early elections,
moreover, might enable them to ride into a majority in the assembly
on the crest of the revolutionary wave of November.s Such attitudes revealed not only the moderation which had come to characterize Social Democracy in Germany, but also the effects of nonparticipation in the affairs of government in undermining the
capacity for leadership.
The Majority Socialists were successful in defeating attempts by
left-wing socialists to postpone calling the National Assembly. On
November 25 a congress of representatives of the revolutionary
governments of several states meeting at Berlin voted by overwhelming majority to convoke an assembly at an early date.
Strengthened by the decision, the Council of Commissars under
Friedrich Ebert's leadership promulgated a new electoral law on
November 30 and decreed February 16, 1919, as the date for election. A National Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils meeting the following month rejected the council system as a permanent
form of government for Germany and upheld the decision for an
early assembly. The Congress even moved the date for elections
from February to January 16, and provided for the convocation of
the National Assembly one month thereafter. 4 The Majority
Socialists had won their point; the base of government was to be
broadened to include those groups deprived of participation in
government by the events of November.
The new electoral law provided for universal, direct, equal, and
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secret elections with P. R. by all German men and women who had
completed their twentieth year of age. 5 The inclusion of P. R. was
a foregone conclusion. A shift of the majority parties of the Reichstag toward the system in 1917-1918 had been confirmed in November, 1918. In the midst of revolutionary uprisings early in the
month, the Social Democratic, Progressive, Center, and National
Liberal parties on November 8 issued a joint proposal calling for
universal P. R. and woman suffrage for all Reichstag and Landtag
elections. 6 These provisions and a lowering of the voting age to
the twentieth year were included in a proclamation four days later
by the Social Democratic Council of Commissars.7
The antiquated distribution of electoral districts used for elections to the former Reichstag was abolished by the November law.
Existing administrative districts were regrouped into 38 new electoral districts from which 433 deputies were to be elected. s The
distribution of seats among districts was based on the principle of
one deputy to an average of 150,000 inhabitants, with a surplus of
at least 75,000 counted as a full 150,000. District populations and
seat allotments varied from District 18 (Arnsberg) with almost
2,500,000 inhabitants and 16 deputies to District 27 (the Palatinate)
with less than 1,000,000 inhabitants and six deputies.
The P. R. provisions of the new law were lifted bodily from the
electoral law of August, 1918. Candidates were nominated in lists
presented to the chairman of the committee for the entire electoral
district. Each list could not contain more names than the number
of deputies to be elected in the district; each required the signatures
of at least one hundred voters in the district. 9 The voter was required to cast his ballot for an entire list; he could not express his
preference among candidates. Allocation of seats within the list
followed the candidates' order of sequence. The November law
hence established a "closed list" system.
Distribution of seats among the lists proceeded according to the
so-called d'Hondt method, one which favored large parties.1° In an
attempt to secure the highest degree of proportionality, however,
the November law incorporated the combined list provisions contained in the August law. Small parties or groups were enabled
thereby to form combinations which counted in the allocation of
seats as one list.
Elections to the National Assembly were preceded by a reorganization of the parties represented in the former Reichstag. l1 Several
rightist groups, the German party (Free Conservatives), the German
Reform party, and the Economic Alliance (Wirtschaftliche Ver-
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einigung) joined with the Conservatives to form the German National People's party. The new organization was dominated by
Prussian Junkers and the industrial plutocracy, and drew support
from lower middle-class and orthodox Protestant elements dissatisfied with the new regime. Anti-Semites were attracted by the
manifestly racial bias. Although frankly monarchical in conviction,
the party declared its willingness to cooperate with the government
to be established by the coming assembly.
Former National Liberals and the Progressives presented two
new combinations to the electorate: the German Democratic party
and the German People's party. Most committed to the ideals of
the new democratic republic were the Democrats. A fusion of
political democracy, nationalism, and laissez-faire modified by an
extensive program of social legislation characterized their platform.
Former Progressives were most numerous within the party, with
men of liberal convictions like Friedrich Naumann and Hugo
Preuss playing prominent roles. The party was universal in its
appeal to all who were democrats and socially minded, but drew
its support chiefly from the middle classes.
The German People's party was fashioned from the remnants of
the National Liberal party. Its leaders were Gustav Stresemann
and others among the wartime annexationists who championed the
interests of heavy industry. Equal political rights for all individuals
were affirmed in the party's platform. Like the conservative Nationalists, however, members of the party regretted the disappearance of the monarchy and withheld commitment to the republican
ideal. The attitude was largely negative, one of passive resistance
to any suggestion of socialization or other radical experimentation
with the nation's economy.
The party of Catholicism, the Center, adopted a new name, the
Christian People's party, but soon reverted to its former designation. Pro-monarchist sympathies were abandoned with obvious
regret. The party stood ready to support a democratic republic;
otherwise it remained the same in conviction as well as composition.
The socialist state was unequivocally rejected. An extension of
social legislation was favored in deference to the Christian trade
unions; pressure from the right-wing clericals, aristocrats, and industrialists, however, precluded any commitment to far-reaching
economic reforms. The struggle between progressivism and conservatism continued within Germany's traditional confessional
party.
The Social Democrats (Majority Socialists) retained their name
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and convictions. Force of habit led them to affirm the Program of
Erfurt and the Marxist theory of class struggle. They opposed all
fonns of dictatorship, however, asserting their faith in democratic
government as the best means with which to achieve social refonn.
The party sought to identify itself with the political accomplishments of the revolution and the social program of the Ebert regime.
The Independent Social Democrats assailed the Majority Socialists
for abdicating proletarian power to a bourgeois constituent assembly. Declaring the necessity for a complete destruction of the
capitalistic structure, they pressed for immediate and total socialization. The Spartacists, constituted late in December as the Communists, hurled insults at both groups and boycotted the elections.
Over 30 million or 83 per cent of the voters went to the polls
on January 19. The returns confirmed the fears of left-wing socialists. Bourgeois parties received a majority of the votes cast. The
socialist monopoly of political power had ended. The official
returns, compared with those for the last Reichstag election in
1912, were as follows: 12
1919
German National People's Party
Conservative Party
German Party (Free Conservative)
Economic Alliance
German Reform Party
German People's Party
National Liberal Party
Christian People's Party .
Center Party
Gennan Democratic Party
Progressive Party
Social Democratic Party
Independent Social Democratic Party
Miscellaneous parties and groups
Total number of deputies

1912

44
43
14
10
3

19

45
91
91
75

42
163"

110

22
7

39
397

• Subsequent elections by military groups gave the Majority Socialists two additional
seats and raised the total number of seats in the National Assembly to 423.

From the standpoint of the parties which gave most unequivocal
support to the new republican regime, the election was a resounding success. The Social Democrats, Democrats, and Christian People's party accounted for more than 75 per cent of all the votes
cast and together received 329 of the 421 seats in the new assembly.
Extremist groups which were lukewarm or in outright opposition
to political democracy ran a poor race. The Nationalist and People's
parties together obtained 63 seats; the Independent Socialists
secured 22.
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The successes of the democratically oriented parties in the
January elections were especially striking when compared with the
composition of the last Imperial Reichstag. The parties of the
political right, including the National Liberals, together received
115 seats in 1912. Anti-Semites, Guelphs, and other minority groups
swelled the nondemocratic composition of the Reichstag to almost
one-third. The parties which consistently favored parliamentary
government in the Reich, the Progressives and the Social Democrats
received 152 seats, or somewhat more than one-third the total number. The approximate balance in the Reichstag between political
left and right was tipped in favor of the latter by the preponderance
in 1912 of right-wing elements within the Center party.
The returns in 1919 revealed a surprising absence of minority
groups and independent deputies by comparison with previous
elections to the Reichstag. In the election of 1912, for example,
five major parties (Conservative, National Liberal, Center, Progressive, Social Democratic) obtained 345 seats, with the remainder distributed as follows:
Hanoverian Guelphs
Danes
Reform Party
Economic Alliance
Alsace-Lorraine
Anti-Semites
Poles
Unaffiliated

5
I

3
10
9
3
18
3

In elections to the National Assembly, however, six parties received
all but seven seats, the latter being distributed among four local
parties or groups. Four seats went to the Bavarian Peasants' Union
and one apiece to provincial parties in Hanover, Brunswick, and
Schleswig-Holstein.
The practical disappearance of minority parties in 1919 was the
result of several factors. Territorially, Germany was not the same
in 1912 and 1919. The loss of Alsace-Lorraine and districts adjacent
to Denmark and Poland removed three separate parties from the
German political scene. The number was reduced further by
mergers among parties of similar convictions formed for common
protection against the socialists. Three minority groups of the
political right joined with the Conservatives to form the German
People's party. Anti-Semites, who elected three deputies in 1912,
also merged with the new conservative front.
The election law undoubtedly contributed to a reduction in the
number of minority groups and independent deputies in 1919. A
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merging of districts in Hanover and Brunswick destroyed the
majorities which had returned Hanoverian Guelphs in 1912, reducing the number of deputies from five to one. The disappearance
of independent deputies (three in the last Reichstag, in addition
to three Anti-Semites) was in all probability related to the introduction of the list system of P. R. Candidates for the former Reichstag needed merely to announce their intentions to run for election
and to furnish the ballots. Nominations for candidacy to the National Assembly were to be supported by the signatures of at least
one hundred qualified voters in the electoral district. The requirement was more easily met by party organizations with their numerous workers and helpers than by independents. The latter were
handicapped further by the provision for combined lists. As independents, they were not likely to join forces with organized
political associations. Even if they wished to do so and could find
a party or group with which to combine, the procedure was complicated for them by provisions of the law which regulated such
matters. Combinations were to be declared in writing to the
authorized election officer of the district by the signatories of the
nomination list or their authorized agents (Article 12). The procedure was comparatively simple for organized political parties,
which could authorize their own agents. Independents, however,
had to secure in support of any combination the same signatures
which had nominated them to candidacy. Such difficulties placed
them at considerable disadvantage in comparison with parties or
groups which could use combined lists with ease and benefit. The
new election law was plainly one for organized political associations,
not for independent candidates.
Did the introduction of P. R. for the elections prevent a Social
Democratic majority in the National Assembly? According to one
observer, Dr. Johannes Schauff, who edited in 1929 a study of the
Weimar election system, "had the majority system of election
been retained, and if only the electoral districts had been equalized
in size, the Social Democrats in elections in 1919 to the National
Assembly ... without question would have acquired far more than
a majority of the mandates."13 While not as positive as Dr. Schauff,
another observer, Dr. Ferdinand Hermens, undoubtedly the foremost opponent of P. R. in this country and Europe, would like to
draw the same conclusion.1 4 Speculating upon the composition of
the Assembly had elections taken place under the majority system,
Dr. Hermens states, "It is not certain that a Social-Democratic majority would have resulted, but it is probable." The conclusion as-
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sumes that the majority system would have forced votes into the
Social Democratic coffer. It assumes that the Independent Socialists would have returned to the Majority fold in order to thwart
elimination at the polls as a minority party. Faced by the likelihood of socialist success in the election, many voters who under P. R.
cast their ballots for other parties, in the words of Dr. Hermens,
"would have jumped on the bandwagon of the victors."
Would the majority system have constructed in 1919 a "bandwagon" for the Social Democrats? It had not done so for them
or for any other group during the Second Reich. Not once during
the latter period had a single party captured a majority of the seats
in the Reichstag. Never were there less than five or six competing
parties. The suffrage, to be sure, had assumed new significance in
the elections of 1919. Never before had the German people as a
whole possessed the right of self-government. Never before had
they been confronted with the task of electing a national parliament
competent to assume responsibility for the direction of public
affairs. A workable majority became imperative if the parliament
were to fulfill its functions adequately. The new role of the national
parliament, however, appeared to affect German voting attitudes
very little. Although the socialists received a larger percentage of
the votes than ever before, the majority of those who went to the
polls cast their ballots as they formerly had done, for the party with
the Weltanschauung which suited their particular tastes. The returns do not indicate any widespread concern with the necessity
for creating a majority party in parliament. Had the German
voters wished to do so, P. R. would not have stopped them. Although
unable to choose particular candidates, they were quite free to vote
for any party nomination list they chose.
German voters failed to elect a Social Democratic majority to
the National Assembly, not as a consequence of P. R., but because
prevailing social and political cleavages were too strong for them
to do otherwise. The fears and animosities which had characterized
relations among socialist and nonsocialist groups for more than half
a century could not be erased in a matter of weeks. Many who had
cast ballots for left-liberal parties in previous elections during the
Second Reich apparently voted socialist in the 1919 elections. The
majority among nonsocialist voters, however, continued to look
askance at Social Democracy and could not bring themselves to
entrust the direction of public affairs to the party traditionally regarded in Germany as the arch-enemy of the state.
As revealed by events occurring immediately prior to the elec-
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tions, German voters even had reason to doubt the competence of
Social Democratic leadership for bringing Germany out of the
chaos of war and revolution. Beginning January 5 and lasting for
more than a week, Berlin was the scene of sporadic violence and
bloodshed as the Communists attempted to overthrow the provisional government of the Social Democratic Council of Commissars.1 5 The latter called for assistance from their worker supporters, but the response was weak and ineffectual. Powerless to
put down the revolt by themselves, the Social Democrats sought
allies among their former enemies, the members of the old officer
caste of the German army. With the aid of generals of the old
regime, Commissar Noske recruited and brought into action several
thousand officers and men. Within days the revolt had been suppressed. Germany was saved from the threat of Bolshevism, but
only with the aid of the military which had supported the conservative domination during the old regime.
It appears highly unlikely, therefore, that majority elections
would have created a Social Democratic "bandwagon" under such
conditions. Most Germans were not convinced either by past experience with the socialists or by the course of events immediately
prior to the elections of the necessity for creating a Social Democratic majority in the Assembly. In view of the bitterness which
characterized the relationship among Independents and Majority
Socialists in 1919, it even appears unlikely that majority elections
would have enforced a union of the two groups. Since the Independents with their scattered votes would have fared badly in that
event, the majority system might well have decreased rather than
increased the total socialist strength in the National Assembly.
What changes in occupational representation were revealed in
the election return~? The following table classifies by profession the
deputies of the last Imperial Reichstag and those of the National
Assembly: 16
Agriculture
Industry and commerce
Public officials (municipal, state, federal)
Teachers and scholars
Clergymen
Lawyers and notaries
Private officials (trade union, party)
Doctors
Authors and journalists
Persons of independent means
'Vorkers and employees
Miscellaneous
Total number of deputies

1912
92

1919
34

35

30
48

46
20
21

32
11

40
48

31
132

7
57

2
64
4
27

8

19
1

8

394

423
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Agriculture declined most among the occupations represented,
dropping from first in the last Reichstag to fourth in the National
Assembly. The representation of employers in industry and commerce declined slightly, whereas that of workers and employees increased by more than one-half. If the two categories are totaled,
the representation of industry and commerce in 1919 comprised 57
deputies, as compared with 34 representatives of agricultural pursuits. In 1912 the respective figures were 44 and 92.
Occupational statistics should be supplemented by a comparison
with party strengths to gain the most accurate picture of the changed
numerical representation in the National Assembly of agriculture,
industry, and commerce. The parties which represented the latter
and the number of deputies which each possessed in 1912 and 1919
are listed in the following table. Figures in parentheses give the
number of deputies engaged in agricultural pursuits.n
German People's Party
National Liberal Party
German Democratic Party
Progressive Party
Social Democratic Party
Independent Social Democratic
Party
Total number of deputies

1919
19 (3)
75 (7)
163
22
279 (10)

1912
45 (13)
42 ( 5)
110
197 (18)

The parties of the political right which formed the Nationalist
party after the Revolution represented chiefly agricultural interests.
In 1912 they polled a total of 60 seats. The addition of 18 deputies
listed in parentheses in the above table and the greatest share of the
39 members of minority groups increased the number of agricultural representatives among the parties of the political right in the
last Reichstag to more than 100. The number was approximately
halved in 1919 when the Nationalists obtained only 44 seats, of
which five were held by employers in industry or commerce; agricultural minority groups secured approximately five additional seats.
Although the Center (Christian People's) party continued in 1919
to represent both agricultural and industrial-commercial interests,
the former no longer predominated as they had in the Reichstag of
1912. More Centrist deputies in the Reichstag were engaged in agriculture than in any other pursuit. Private officials predominated
within the party's representation in the National Assembly, however, and agrarian deputies (totaling eight in number) shared
fourth place numerically with the lawyers and notaries. Although
statistical comparisons are difficult to draw with accuracy, the above
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figures illustrate a striking reversal of the numerical representation
of agricultural and industrial-commercial interests. A slight predominance of the former in the last Reichstag was supplanted by an
approximate two-thirds majority of the latter in the National Assembly.
The election law was instrumental in producing the phenomenal
increase of trade union and party officials in the National Assembly. Seats won by parties in the election were distributed within
the nomination lists beginning with the first name designated and
proceeding in order to the last. No provision was made for regulating the method of selecting candidates or their sequences on the list.
Party organizations were left free to determine their own nomination procedures. They were not compelled to submit proofs as
they are today in West Germany that candidate lists were chosen
by democratic processes within the party. In the absence of such
regulations, it was not at all surprising that party functionaries and
prominent trade union officials found high places on the various
nomination lists. Although the lists usually were submitted by
party leaders to an assembly of the members for approval, they
were rarely changed.1s
The appearance of so many party bureaucrats in the National
Assembly reflected the extent to which party structures were revolutionized by the election law. Under the former majority system used
during the Second Reich, only the Social Democratic and the Center
parties maintained organizations throughout the country, and these
were strongest in districts where the respective voting strengths
were concentrated_19 In places where constituents were few and
success was unlikely, decisions on matters of organization and tactics
generally were left to local party members. The situation was quite
different under the new election law. Scattered minorities were
thrown together by the creation of large electoral districts. No
longer were they potentially useless to the party. With the introduction of P. R. they could be combined and utilized for the election of deputies. As expressed by a Democratic election pamphlet
explaining the new law, "organization" became "trump" for the
political party_20 Each attempted to organize its supporters throughout the country; offices were established even in the smallest localities. Party organizations increased both in number and power.
The number of full-time party workers mushroomed. As reflected
in the membership of the National Assembly and subsequent
Reichstags, political advancement became increasingly a matter of
working one's way up through the party hierarchy.21
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The electoral law was widely criticized after the January elections. 22 Complaints were leveled against the law's closed-list proVISIOns. The compulsion of the voter to select a list and not a
candidate was termed a restriction of the franchise. The latter became a right of the party, not of the individual, when candidates
were chosen by party organizations. As pointed out by some opponents, districts were so large that candidates were unacquainted
with their constituents. Many voters cast ballots for the election of
complete strangers. Control of nominations by the party, others
argued, led to fierce and disruptive battles among competing cliques.
Each sought by whatever means possible to place its candidates at
the head of the party list. Disappointment might lead to secession.
Party unity was imperiled.
The principal reasons for complaint against the electoral law
were to be found in the effects of the d'Hondt method of allocation
and the provisions allowing parties to combine lists. The effects
may be illustrated by comparing the following figures. Those in
columns one and two list respectively the seats which each party
obtained in the election and the number which each would have
received without list combinations. Those in column three represent theoretical proportionality.23
German National People's Party
German People's Party
Christian People's Party
German Democratic Party
Social Democratic Party
Independent Social Democratic Party
Miscellaneous parties

44
19
91
75
163
22
7

42
17
87
75
174
22
4

43
18
83
78
160
32
7

The d'Hondt system of allocation clearly favored large parties and
handicapped small ones. Had other parties not used the law's
combined list provisions, the Social Democrats would have received
14 seats and the Christian People's party three seats above full proportionality. The Independents would have lost, and, as the election turned out, did lose, ten places. Without the provisions to
combine lists, three minority groups would have been excluded from
the Assembly entirely, the Democrats would have forfeited three
seats and the Nationalist and German People's parties one apiece.
Even with these provisions, large parties benefited more in the final
counting than small ones. Although list combinations cut down the
Social Democratic advantage to three seats above full proportionality, they enabled the Christian People's party to acquire three
additional mandates, raising its total to 11 above the proportional
figure. The Independents and to a lesser extent the Majority
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Socialists were excluded or remained aloof from alliances with
other parties and thus failed to benefit from list combinations.24
The parties which fared badly or coveted the gains of others
from the method of seat allocation or list combinations were most
critical of the electoral law. 25 The Social Democrats were irked by
the loss of so many seats to alliances among bourgeois parties. The
experience was reminiscent of Reichstag elections during the Second
Reich when other parties combined against them in the hated runoff elections. The Democrats lost no seats from list combinations,26
and received in the final counting only three seats less than full
proportionality. They felt cheated, however, when their showing
was compared with that of the Christian People's party. They had
received a total of 5,641,800 votes in the election; the latter party
had received 5,980,200. On the basis of full proportionality the
respective seat totals should have been 78 and 83. In the actual
counting, the difference between the two totals amounted to 16
seats. "The reason for this all-too·great disproportionality," according to one Democrat, "one may observe in many places in list combinations within individual electoral districts between the Center
and small parties. A simple mathematical demonstration reveals
that the chief reason for the advantage of the stronger parties rests
precisely in the allocation procedure itself."27
Party attitudes toward list combinations were affected by a
new system for allotting seats which gained favor in 1919. The system, used during the Second Reich for municipal elections in
Baden, provided a way in which to utilize votes which remained
after seats had been allotted to party lists. The leftover votes from
each district could be combined for the election of deputies-at-Iarge.
The system was accepted on November 24, 1919, by a special commission from the Constitutional Committee,28 and became the
basis for an electoral law adopted in 1920 by the entire Assembly.
It seemed to provide political parties with a more attractive alternative than list combinations. Not only did the latter, like runoff
elections to former Reichtags, appear to be "immoral" and "unnatural," but they also carried no certainty of success. Parties like
the Democrats might join in several combinations and not gain a
single additional seat. A system of election providing for the maximum utilization of all votes seemed to offer each party the assurance that it would not receive less, and its opponents would not receive more, than a just proportion of seats.
Criticisms of the electoral law for the National Assembly thus
were concerned almost entirely with the problem of unused votes
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and disproportionalities in the allotment of seats among parties.
Only those which were directed against closed lists, against a restriction of the voter's choice to party lists rather than candidates, implied any real criticism of P. R. itself; and even they were presented
by individuals who merely favored a proportional system without
listS.29 So widespread was the acceptance of P. R. in 1919 that a
representative of the Ministry of the Interior could matter-of-factly
assert in an official publication that "the universal introduction of
the system of proportional representation for elections to the N ational Assembly through the Reich electoral law of November 30,
1918, was greeted with satisfaction on all sides. Nobody has
criticized proportional representation or demanded retention of
the old majority system of election."30 The assertions were borne
out by the subsequent action of the National Assembly in drafting
and adopting by ananimous vote an electoral law which represented the ultimate in proportionality.
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representation was retained without question
by the National Assembly in 1919-1920. In the provisional
constitution drafted early in January, 1919, by Hugo Preuss,
Secretary of State for the Interior,! the system was prescribed as
mandatory for elections to all state legislatures and the Reichstag. 2
The provisions were upheld when the Preuss draft was adopted on
February 10, 1919, by the recently convened Assembly. They appeared in revised form in the final draft constructed by the As·
sembly and approved by that body on July 31. Discussion and
debate in committee and on the floor of the Assembly prior to promulgation of a new electoral law in April, 1920, revealed a striking
unanimity in favor of P. R. Scarcely a voice was raised in support
of the former majority system of election.
"The principle of proportional representation appears to me
to be incontestable [ausser Streit] . ... "3 This was the view expressed
by Secretary Preuss on March 20, 1919, to the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly. The view was upheld when the
Committee voted to adopt Article 16 of the provisional constitution
calling for universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage and P. R.
for elections to all state legislatures. Dr. Preuss reported during the
meeting that his ministry was studying and comparing various
systems of P. R., and suggested a meeting with members of the
Committee for the purpose of discussing the systems. "I shall then
determine," he concluded, "the various points of view-chiefly within the Constitutional Committee-regarding the best system of
proportional representation, and upon this basis will compose a
draft of the Reich electorallaw."4
On April 4, 1919, the Committee adopted the following construction of an article regulating Reichstag elections:
ROPORTIONAL

P

The Reichstag consists of deputies of the German people.
The deputies are elected in universal, equal, direct, and
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secret elections by men and women over twenty years of age
and according to the principles of proportional representation.
The particulars will be defined by a Reich electoral law,
which also shall regulate the election of the Reich president
and plebiscites. 1i
Committee discussions of the article produced one of the few
objections to the proportional principle voiced by a member of the
National Assembly.6 "Proportional representation," the Democratic
leader, Friedrich Naumann, declared to the Committee,"still has
certain questionable aspects, even though to all outward appearances it is without question the most equitable system of election."
The principal objection presented by Naumann concerned the system's effects upon the composition of the parliament. By giving expression to all shades of political opinion in the parliament, P. R.
was alleged to render impossible the emergence of a two-party system
on the English model, regarded by Naumann as indispensable to
parliamentary government. "The consequence of the system of
proportional representation," he concluded, "is the impossibility
of parliamentary government; the parliamentary system and proportional representation are mutually exclusive."
"I should not like to allow Deputy Naumann's statements to
pass without contradiction," replied Secretary Preuss as he launched
into a defense of P. R.7 "We never had proportional elections to
the Reichstag in Germany," he declared, "and yet our parties always
were numerous as the sands of the sea. With the first proportional
elections [to the National Assembly] they even have diminished in
number." Two-party systems, he maintained, were not indispensable
to parliamentary government; coalitions also could be formed. The
latter, to be sure, were more difficult to maintain than majorities
consisting of one party. The possession of political power by the
parliament, however, would lead to a consolidation among parties,
"with or without proportional representation." Dr. Preuss thus
denied the effects of election systems upon the function of parliamentary bodies. That the latter possessed political power sufficed
to create increasingly compact party majorities. The interpretation
was the exact reverse of Friedrich Naumann's, which emphasized the
effects of election systems and seemed to ignore the consequences
of wielding political power upon the party composition of the
parliament. 8
Deputy Naumann must have wryly acknowledged to himself the
truth of one statement reiterated by Secretary Preuss to the Com-
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mittee: "To return from the proportional representation system to
simple majority elections is a political impossibility."9 Seldom if at
all can parliaments elected under P. R. be persuaded to discard the
system. In the case of the National Assembly, each among the
several parties therein contained deputies returned by minorities
whose votes formerly were lost under the majority system. Deputies
so elected would exclude themselves from political life by voting
to discard P. R. A majority of the deputies to the National Assembly, for that matter, owed their selection to party committees
and organizations which had placed them high on the nomination
lists. Few could be expected to jeopardize their personal political
fortunes by voting to return to a system in which selection lay
with the unpredictable electorate. Neither could central party
organizations wish to abandon the system which not only had increased their control over nominations, but also had extended them
into new districts by making possible the utilization of minority
strengths. P. R. had created an Assembly of vested interests. Seemingly without question the members of the Constitutional Com·
mittee sustained Dr. Preuss' conclusion: "The sentence 'according to
the principles of proportional representation' must stand, regardless of theoretical points of view one may hold concerning the
proportional system. The object of further discussion shall be to
find the comparably best system of proportional representation."lO
Secretary Preuss and the Committee soon were rewarded by the
discovery of Baden's so-called "automatic" system of election. As
described in the new Baden constitution (Article 24),
each party or group of electors is allowed one member
for every ten thousand votes cast for its list of candidates.
In each district the votes remaining unused are added up for
the whole country and are apportioned representation according to the prmciple deSCrIbed above. Every fraction of
more than 7,500 votes is permitted a seat.H
The procedure was adopted in principle by the Committee in
November, and expanded into three variations, or "projects," submitted for public perusal by the Ministry of the Interior shortly
after the first of the year. 12
Project A embodied the Baden system in its purest form. A
uniform vote total (60,000) necessary for the election of deputies
in all districts was established. Districts sufficient in size to return
approximately six deputies were to be created. Votes remaining
after seat allocations in all districts would be accumulated to the
credit of nondistrict or "Reich" lists presented by the various
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parties. Seats would be distributed among the latter in the same
manner as within districts.
Proj~ct B differed from the above in two respects. Districts
were to be reduced in size to return approximately four deputies.
Secondly, another stage in the allocation of seats was inserted between the districts and the Reich lists. Several adjacent districts
were to be combined for a second allocation among unused votes
forwarded from the individual districts. Remaining votes then
would be sent to the Reich lists.
The complexity increased with Project C, which was identical
with Project B, save one important exception. Within any given
group of districts, parties had two alternatives. They could present
a separate nomination list within each district, or one for the entire
group. In the latter event, votes cast for the party within each
district would be totaled and accredited to the group list. Seat
allocations in the former event would proceed according to the
plan in Project B. Unused votes in either case would be sent to
Reich lists for a second and final allocation.
As reported by Preuss·' successor as Minister of the Interior,
Erich Koch,13 Project C "obviously found the greatest public
approval."14 Small districts were favored over large ones, since the
latter allegedly depersonalized the relationship between voter and
deputy. They also necessitated the presentation of long lists of
candidates by each party. Although Project B also provided for
small districts, its three stages of allocation placed a tremendous
burden of work on electoral authorities in preparing for the elections and allotting the ballots. Project C cut down the work involved, eliminating one stage in the allocation of seats. Under the
latter, moreover, the greatest number of leftover votes would be
utilized in the districts and groups of districts. The number of
deputies elected indirectly from the Reich lists would be reduced
to a minimum. By making possible the presentation of separate
lists in each district or a single one for a group of districts, Project
C also permitted the parties to organize and group their potential
voting strengths as they wished.
Were there no complaints against all three projects? Was there
no recognition of the dangers involved for the future of parliamentary government in according almost complete expression to
minority groups within the electorate? The German people early
in 1920 seemingly had neither the time nor the inclination to
raise questions of such nature. Their political experience had not
provided them with any widespread knowledge or experience con-
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cerning the function of parliamentary bodies in democratic systems.
The Reichstag during the Second Reich never had possessed more
than the power to advise the government or restrict its actions;
the political parties never had been exposed to the responsibilities
of directing public policy.
Only one deputy in the National Assembly voiced any misgivings
regarding Projects A, B, and C. "A single year," Anton Erkelenz
complained in his party journal, Die Hilfe, "has sufficed to produce
a whole bundle of discoveries of new election systems according to
the classifications: just, more just, and most just. ... In honor of
the Kaiser's birthday the Ministry of the Interior has just presented
us with three among the 'most just' suffrage discoveries. And now
we can quietly go to sleep. By your leave, my gentlemen of the
Ministry, there is a limit to the 'justice' of an electoral procedure,
beyond which each further step toward mathematical fairness is
quadratically increasing political stupidity."15 Deputy Erkelenz
warned specifically against the dangers of party splintering inherent
in all three proposals:
Not only wiIl there be out-and-out worker, employee, peasant,
handworker, industrial-trade, etc., candidates. No! The
vaccine opponents, teetotalers, advocates of temperance,
Knights Templars, land reformers, officers of the crown, and
with them the rabbit growers, the vaccinators, the goat breeders ... among others will present their own candidates, will
wish to count their votes in the Reich. There will be at least
200 points of view or associations able to poll 60,000 and
more votes .... 'Justice' in the sense of mathematical equality
thus will lead politically to self-murder, to absurdity.16
Although his words seemed to belie the fact, Deputy Erkelenz was
not opposed to the proportional principle. The introduction of
P. R. for national elections in Germany was regarded by him as a
"proper" solution to the "antiquated electoral districting" of the
former Reichstag election system. 17 He was among the first of the
proportionalists in Germany to give belated attention to the problem of the function rather than the composition of the parliament.
From the vantage point of the present, his conclusion may have been
prophetic:
With the electoral law the German Republic stands perhaps
at a crucial turning point in its existence. The electoral procedure is not a question of mathematical justice. Once universal proportional representation has been achieved it is
exclusively a political problem of grave significance. If the
~epublic allows itself to be led by sentimentalists it will dig
Its own grave. A parliament consisting of 400 eccentrics can-
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not make policy [Politik machen]. It will become a laughing
stock.1 8
The warning went unheeded. Project C was accepted by the
Cabinet and became the basis for an electoral law drawn up by
the Ministry of the Interior and submitted on March 27, 1920, to
the National Assembly.19 The draft allowed parties the option of
presenting lists either by district or by groups of districts; leftover
votes in either case would be accumulated to the credit of lists for
the Reich. The draft also marked out 122 electoral districts designed
to elect from three to five deputies, and 21 groups of districts. 20
The swift movement of events during March, 1920, brought
changes in the projected electoral law even before it was submitted
to the National Assembly. During the first part of the month,
parties of the political right moved to dissolve the Assembly on
the first of May and called for early elections to a new Reichstag.
The motion was defeated on March 10 after Minister of the Interior
Koch indicated the number of laws still to be enacted and insisted
on the need for a thorough study of a new electoral law. The Assembly, he declared, could not be dissolved nor elections held before
autumn. 21 Rightist groups subsequently resorted to force. For
several days during the so-called Kapp Putsch a military regime in
Berlin attempted to dominate Germany. The regime was ousted
and the Republic restored only after German workers in a general
strike brought economic life in the country to a standstill.
Subsequent disturbances in the Ruhr and ministerial crises in
the National Assembly made new elections imperative. A government competent to deal with the trying questions of the hour must
have the assurance of public support. To delay the elections was to
invite continued disorder and uncertainty, perhaps another attempt
to overthrow the Republic. The Assembly sent the proposed electorallaw to committee and hastily began work on the most pressing
legislation which remained.
The committee made extensive revision of the proposed electoral procedure. 22 Since the necessity for early elections appeared
to leave no time for a new distribution of districts, the 122 new
districts and the 22 groups of districts were abandoned in favor of
the division used for elections to the National Assembly. After
slight modifications to rectify certain inequalities in size, 35 districts and 17 groups of districts were established. A second change
by the committee concerned the allocation of seats. The original
draft left parties the option of presenting separate lists in each
district or one for an entire group, the latter being counted as one
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district in the totaling of votes and the allocation of seats. Since
the committee had discarded the original plan for redistricting,
several districts were large enough to elect approximately fifteen
deputies, and hence would necessitate excessively long ballots if
parties were to present one list for an entire group. There would
be less likelihood than before that voters would be acquainted with
all the candidates presented by one party. To remedy the difficulty
the committee removed the option to present one list for an entire
group of districts. Leftover votes in each district would go directly
to Reich lists for the election of deputies.at-Iarge. It was estimated
on the basis of statistics from the National Assembly elections, however, that under such an arrangement, with no "middle" allocation,
approximately 18 per cent of the deputies of the new Reichstag
might be elected from the Reich lists. 28 The largeness of the percentage might call in question the compatibility of the mode of seat
allocation with the constitutional principle of direct elections. The
solution: provide for a partial utilization of vote fractions in the
districts before their transference to the Reich lists. If a party
declared in advance of the election a union of its lists within a group
of districts, leftover votes could be accumulated to the credit of the
list with the largest remainder. Fractions then would be transferred
to Reich lists.
An atmosphere of haste characterized the debates in the Assembly on the proposed electorallaw. 24 Referring to the Kapp Putsch,
the Social Democratic speaker who reported the bill out of committee for its second reading on April 22 spoke of the "political
events" which had made impossible a "thorough consideration" of
the election system. "The committee therefore found it necessary
to follow insofar as possible existing statutes and only to make
either those changes which appeared to be absolutely essential or
those which received universal approval."25 A Democratic spokesman directing his remarks to the "gentlemen on the right" referred
to the necessity for early elections as a consequence of the "unbelievable agitation of certain parties against the government and the
majority parties."26 "Time presses," was the keynote expressed
by a Centrist spokesman. 27 An Independent Social Democratic
speaker recognized the necessity for early elections as a consequence
of the Kapp Putsch, but expressed his party's disapproval of the
delay which had attended the drafting of a new electoral law. "The
constitution, which established the principal features of the suffrage," he complained, "was ready three-quarters of a year ago.
There should have been opportunity during this long period of
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time to present a bilI which could have been introduced in time
[for the coming election]."28
As viewed by Minister of the Interior Koch, the pressure of time
had not detracted from the merits of the law drafted by his ministry
and the National Assembly committee. Speaking before the Assembly during the April 22 debate, he declared his "overwhelming
satisfaction" with the draft, not as a consequence of the "understandable pleasure" which he, "the author," derived from it, but
because the charge never could be leveled against the National
Assembly that it had indulged in "gerrymandering [Wahlkreisgeometrie] or any other kind of electoral irregularity."29 This was an
election system, he assured the deputies, which "the man in the
street" could understandl "If we decide that everybody [sic!] who
receives 60,000 votes shall be elected, then we shall acquire a popular
and an easily understandable suffrage. Yes, we shall even experience
the time, if I may designate this as an advantage, when we shall be
able to hold victory celebrations on election day evening, namely
for the reason that under proportional representation not just one
party wins, but in most cases even all the parties in all the districtS."30
The Minister's enthusiasm was echoed in the Assembly debate.
"The Revolution of November, 1918," the Social Democrats exclaimed, "brought to the German people the freest suffrage in the
world. The bill which lies before us can be held aloft in the progressive countries, yes, in all the civilized lands [Kulturliindern]."31 A
Democratic speaker pointed with pride to the so-called "automatic
system" of allocation, whereby each unit of 60,000 votes sufficed
for the election of one deputy. It was "without doubt" "the most
just" method available, one which permitted no party an advantage
over others in the allocation of seats. Charges of gerrymandering,
or "electoral district geometry," as the Germans quaintly described
the practice, thus were dismissed by the speaker as groundless.
"Everybody who participated [in drafting the electoral law] must
recognize as groundless contentions that the attitudes of the committee were those of anyone political party."32 Even the Nationalists seemed satisfied with the proposed law. They had expressed concern early in March over the possibility that any electoral
law introduced by the majority parties might eliminate "the right
side of the house."33 During the April 22 debate, however, they
commended the draft of the electoral law as a "satisfactory piece of
work," and were supported in this view by members of the German
People's party.34
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Despite the universal acclaim received by the proposed electoral
law, debates in the Assembly seemed to leave little doubt that a
majority of the parties planned future revisions. Provisions withholding the right to vote from members of the armed forces were
strongly contested by both socialist parties. In yielding to the wishes
of the majority in the Assembly, the Social Democrats promised to
reopen the matter immediately in the new Reichstag. 35 Both parties,
particularly the Independents, designated the postponement of
redistricting as one of the most serious defects of the proposed law.
The retention of large districts and the creation of groups among
the latter necessitated the use of long lists of candidates, many of
whom would be unknown to the electorate. The consequence would
be to destroy "all connection between the voter and the deputy."
"I hope," an Independent deputy stated, "that the defects contained
in the law at least will be remedied immediately by the new Reichstag. They make it difficult for us to vote for the bill. I regard it
as absolutely necessary that the new Reichstag will not again postpone to its termination a reform of the suffrage, but that it will
proceed very quickly to the matter."36
The Democrats also left no doubt concerning their plans for
revision of the electoral law. "It will very likely be a law regulating
only one election," a spokesman declared, "after which further reform will be necessary. It probably would have been best at the
outset had we designated the heading as a law for the election of
the first Reichstag."37 The speaker referred in particular to the
necessity for combining in a future electoral law the advantages of
P. R. with those of the former single-member district system. The
latter were designated by him as pertaining to the freedom of the
voter to cast his ballot for an individual candidate. Such advantages,
however, could not be included in the present law. The necessity
for early elections, the speaker contended, made necessary a retention of the so-called "closed lists," which restricted the voter to a
choice among parties, not individual candidates. "If we were to do
away with closed lists, then the procedure of allocating seats among
candidates would be extraordinarily involved and prolonged. Then
it would be inconceivable that the Reichstag could be convened
within a short time after the elections."38
The parties of the political center and right were less definite
on the matter of suffrage reform than the Democratic and socialist
parties. The Centrists and the German Nationalists supported the
draft, but made no commitments regarding future alterations. 30
A spokesman for the German People's party stated that the measure
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was "completely in harmony" with the needs of the moment, but
also referred to it as a "provisional law." The latter's "principal"
shortcoming, the lack of small districts, he stated, could not be
remedied due to the necessity for early elections. In the meantime,
however, material should be assembled "in order to acquire without delay suitable bases for an exact establishment of the small
election districts."40
After devoting almost the entirety of its session on April 22 to
the second reading of the electoral bill, the Assembly proceeded the
following day to the third reading. Without further debate the
final vote was taken. Three hundred one deputies voted "ja" to
make the decision unanimous. The bill became law on April 27
and was followed on May 1 by an ordinance regulating the details
for the coming elections. 41
The new electoral law extended the suffrage to all persons, regardless of sex, who were twenty years of age on election day.
Exceptions included those under guardianship or deprived of civil
rights by court decisions. By contrast with their situation during
the Second Reich, bankrupts and paupers no longer were excluded.
Temporarily prohibited from exercising the suffrage were soldiers
in the Reichswehr and persons detained in mental institutions and
prisons. Those imprisoned for political reasons, however, were
entitled to request arrangements permitting them to vote. Every
elector whose name appeared on an official list or roll was entitled
to cast one ballot. To become a candidate for election each voter
must have attained the twenty-fifth year of age.
An elaborate election machinery came into being with the law
of 1920.42 In addition to local precinct boards which supervised the
casting of ballots and tallied the results, electoral committees were
established for each of the 35 districts and the 17 groups of districts.
District committees received the nomination lists, to be presented
within a 2l-day period prior to the election, and checked the
authenticity of the 50 signatures required in support of each list.
After the elections had taken place and the precinct boards had
totaled and transmitted the ballots, each committee allotted seats
among the nomination lists on the basis of one for every 60,000
votes. Fractions then were forwarded either to the committee of the
group to which the district belonged, or to one for the entire Reich.
If nomination lists had been joined by prior action of their signatories 43 with others within the group to which the district belonged,
their vote remainders were sent to the group committees for the
second allocation of seats. If they had not been joined, their re-
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mainders were forwarded directly to a committee for the Reich.
The committees for each group of districts accorded each combination of lists one seat for every 60,000 votes. Seats were distributed
within the combinations among the lists with the largest fractions,
on the condition that the latter exceeded 30,000 votes. Remainders
then were forwarded to the committee for the Reich, where they
joined those sent directly from the districts for a final allocation of
seats. They were assigned by the committee to their respective lists
for the Reich, i.e., to separate tickets filed with the committee by
the same parties or groups which presented candidates in the
districts. 44 Seats were apportioned among the Reich lists on the
basis of one for each unit of 60,000 votes, with every fraction in
excess of 30,000 considered equal to the full quota. Reich lists,
however, were not permitted to acquire seats in excess of the total
won by their respective counterparts in the districts.
The provisions allowing parties to join lists within established
groups of districts were intended as substitutes for the combined
lists of the electoral law for the National Assembly. The latter
furnished no means for the utilization of vote fractions other than
allowing parties to present lists in common within the various districts. The 1920 law did not prohibit such combinations, but removed the incentive for their formation by allowing each party
almost unlimited opportunities for the utilization of its own votes.
According to the regulations set forth in the law, either type of
combination (i.e., among different parties within a single district
or among lists of the same party in several districts) was to be
registered within the prescribed time limit of fourteen days prior to
the election. Neither was valid unless an identical combination was
presented to the committee for the Reich. Seats were allotted
within either type of combination to lists with the largest fractions,
provided the latter exceeded 30,000 votes. Unused fractions then
were forwarded to the respective Reich lists for a final allocation. 45
The distribution of seats within all nomination lists followed
the sequence in which the candidates were designated. The parties
or groups which presented lists were permitted to establish the
sequence. Voters cast their ballots for party tickets, not for individual candidates. With the exception of time limits required for
the presentation of district and Reich lists, the law was silent on
the nomination procedure. Parties or groups were not required,
as they are today in West Germany, to furnish proof of democratic
processes in the selection of candidates.
German voters went to the polls on June 6, 1920. Since elections
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could not be held in several districts where plebiscites had been
ordered by the allied powers, 42 members of the former National
Assembly elected from the areas in question were counted as deputies
to the new Reichstag. 46 The following table lists the total votes
and seats received by each party in the elections. Figures in parentheses represent the number of seats held over from the National
Assembly.47
(Majority) Social Democratic Party
Independent Social Democratic Party
Center Party
German National People's Party
People's Party
German Democratic Party
Bavarian People's Party
Guelph Party
Bavarian Peasant's Union
Communist Party

5,614,456
4,895,317
3,540,830
3,736,778
3,606,316
2,202,334
1,171,722
319,100
218,884
441,995

112
81
68
66
62
45
21

(19)
(8)
(4)
(2)
(9)

5
4
2
466

(42)

The returns were devastating for the parties of the majority coalition of the former National Assembly. In the Assembly the Social
Democratic, Democratic, and Christian People's (Center) parties together had 231 deputies, or 54.6 per cent of the total membership. In
the new Reichstag the representation of the same parties dropped to
125 seats, or 26.8 per cent of the total. The Democrats suffered
most among the three parties, declining from 75 seats (17.7 per
cent) in 19H1 to 45 (9.6 per cent) in 1920. Although membership
percentages of the socialist parties combined were almost identical
in the two parliaments (44.2 per cent in 1919 and 45.7 per cent in
1920), the Majority Socialists lost heavily in the 1920 elections to
the Independents, dropping from 165 seats (39.0 per cent) in 1919
to 112 (24.0 per cent) in the new Reichstag. The Center4 8 emerged
from the election contest appreciably weakened by the defection
of its Bavarian wing. The party decreased in membership from 91
seats (21.5 per cent) in the National Assembly to 68 (14.5 per cent)
in the new Reichstag.
The returns clearly indicated a striking decline of republican
sentiment in Germany. Within little more than a year public support had been withdrawn from those parties most closely associated
with the new Republic in favor of the latter's opponents. The gains
of the parties which favored a return to the old regime had been
spectacular. The Nationalist and German People's parties together
acquired more than three and a half million votes over the combined
total for the two parties in 1919, as compared with a loss of more
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than three million suffered by the Democrats. The People's party
alone almost tripled the number of its votes over the previous balloting, and more than tripled the number of seats acquired. Other
opponents of the Republic scoring gains were the Independent
Social Democrats and the Communists. The latter had not presented candidates in the 1919 elections, but did so in 1920 and
acquired almost one-half million votes. The provisions of the
electoral law prohibiting parties from acquiring more seats from
Reich lists than the total received in the districts restricted the
Communists to two seats in the new Reichstag. The successes of
the Independents were as spectacular as those of the People's party.
An increase of more than two and one-half million votes almost
quadrupled the number of their deputies. The total number of
seats obtained by the above four parties was 211. The avowed
opponents of the Republic thus possessed more than 45 per cent
of the seats in the new Reichstag.
Several factors contributed to the decline of republican sentiment in Germany. Responsibility for military defeat and the ensuing Treaty of Versailles was foisted upon the republicans by
rightist groups asserting their "stab-in-the-back" interpretation of
the November revolution. Economic distress, always a potent factor
in any election, became widespread with rising utiemployment and
soaring living costs. As the new Republican government floundered
from one crisis to another the impression grew among German
voters that economic ills and political instability were inescapable
consequences of popular rule.
Dissatisfaction with Social Democratic leadership also appeared
to influence many voters, particularly among the workers. Internecine party struggles were accentuated as Majority Socialists in
the provisional government called in desperation upon the military
to suppress uprisings in industrial districts like the Ruhr. The
consequent spilling of proletarian blood increased the vituperation
of the Independents against a majority group condemned as betrayers of the socialist cause, as allies of the forces of reaction and
suppression which long had dominated German society and politics.
Nowhere were the tragic effects of democratic inexperience more apparent than in the record of Social Democratic indecision and the
consequent disillusionment with republican leadership among the
masses of the German people.
The elections altered very slightly the proportions in which the
various occupations were represented in the former Assembly. The
table which follows compares the deputies in the latter with those
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in the new Reichstag by listing the percentages engaged in each
occuption. 49
Agriculture
Industry and commerce
Public officials (municipal, state, federal)
Teachers and scholars
Clergymen
Lawyers and notaries
Private officials (trade union, party)
Doctors
Authors and journalists
Persons of independent means
Workers and employees
Miscellaneous

1919

1920

7.9
7.0

12.0

11.4

15.0

75
2.6
7.3

7.6

31.1
0.5
15.2
0.9
6.4
1.9

8.1

2.0
3.9
28.0
0.9

14.7
0.2

7.3
1.5

The preponderance of private officials which appeared with the
introduction of P. R. in the 1919 elections thus decreased very
little. Despite a slight increase in percentage representation, agricultural interests remained secondary in importance to those of
industry and commerce. The parties which represented principally
the latter, the Democratic, Social Democratic, Independent, and
People's parties, possessed 300 seats in the Reichstag. The number
of deputies in the four groups which represented predominantly
agricultural interests (ten in the People's party, two in the Democratic) was more than offset by the workers and employees (six) and
trade union officials (15) in the Center and Bavarian People's
parties. Industrial and commercial interests thus continued to
maintain an approximate two-thirds majority in the national
parliament.
The returns revealed striking increases in the numbers and
strengths of minority parties as compared with the results of the
1919 elections. Four minorities were restricted to a total of seven
seats in the National Assembly. In the 1920 elections, however, the
same number of groups elected 32 deputies. The increase of
minority strength actually was greater than indicated by the official
returns, since several deputies elected by local groups in combination with other parties were listed with the latter in the published
results.50 The statistics reveal that the Nationalists in three separate
districts were accredited with seven deputies elected in combination
with local groups. In District 13 (Thuringia) the "Vereinigte
Landwirtschaftliche Berufsvereinigungen Thiiringens" acquired
two seats counted in the published results as belonging to the Nationalists, and also sent a remainder of 56,531 votes to the Reich
lists to secure the election of an additional Nationalist deputy. In
District 34 (Wiirttemberg), the same party was credited with four
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deputies, three of whom were elected by the "Wiirttembergische
Bauern- und Weingartnerbund (Bund der Landwirte)" and another
by the "Wiirttembergische Biirgerpartei." A remainder of 56,327
votes from the two groups was forwarded to the Reich lists for the
election of an additional Nationalist deputy. In District 21 (HesseNassau), two other local groups, the "Hessische Volkspartei" and
the "Hessische Bauernbund," combined lists with the Nationalists
to elect one deputy for the latter. A total of 23,224 votes obtained
by the combination was forwarded to the Reich lists. The Nationalist party thus was accredited with seven seats as a consequence of
combinations with local groups, and perhaps obtained as many as
three additional seats from the vote remainders forwarded in these
instances to the party's Reich ticket. The party's composition
swelled the number and strength of minorities represented in the
new Reichstag to a total of seven groups and 38 deputies.
In addition to the minorities which won seats in 1920, many
were unsuccessful in the election. The total votes which they received are listed in the following table: 51
Deutsche Mittelstandspartei
Deutsche W'irtsehafts- und Arbeitspartei
Nationaldemokratisehe Volkspartei
Deutseh-Wirtschaftsbund fUr Stadt und Land
Deutsehsozialistisehe Partei
Lausitzer Volkspartei
Reformgruppe
Fraktionslose Partei
Christlieh -soziale Volkspartei"'
Polenpartei

11,970
43
3,998
88,652
7,216
8,052
6,814
169
66,447
76,497
269,858

• All but 1,228 of the party's votes were sent to the central electoral committee for the
Reich, where they were combined with those of the Bavarian People's Party to aid in the
election of three additional deputies for the latter,

When the above total is added to the 2,624,559 votes polled by the
seven minorities which were successful in electing candidates, the
total number of votes received by all local groups and splinter
parties in the 1920 elections becomes 2,894,417. Seventeen minorities hence polled almost three million votes, or approximately 11
per cent of the total number cast.
The electoral law undoubtedly contributed to the striking increase in minority voting strengths in the 1920 elections. Under
the former d'Hondt system of allocation used for the National Assembly, the number of votes necessary for the election of deputies
varied with the number and strength of the participants. The
variable quotas worked to the disadvantage of small parties, allotting
them less than their proportionate share of representation.~2 The
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electoral law of 1920, however, assured each organization which
presented candidates the election of one deputy for each unit of
60,000 votes polled within any given district. The groups of districts
and the Reich lists presented a variety of opportunities for combining and utilizing vote fractions for the election of additional
deputies. Such provisions lost their complexity and assumed increasing political significance as Germans became acquainted with
the functioning of P. R. systems in numerous state and local elections during the first year of the Republic. The number and strength
of minority groups consequently multiplied.
A classification of seats acquired by each party in the three stages
of allocation provided by the electoral law reveals the latter's advantage to small parties. Column I of the following table lists the
seats acquired by each party in the districts, column II does the
same for the groups of districts, and column III the same for the
Reich lists. A final column contains the percentage represented by
columns II and III in the total number of seats for each party.53
I
(Majority) Social Democratic Party
Independent Social Democratic Party
Center Party
German National People's Party
People's Party
German Democratic Party
Bavarian People's Party
Guelph Party
Bavarian Peasant's Union
Communist Party

77
66
47
46
47
20
18
4
3
I

II

III

IV

9

8
7
6

.18
.18
.20
.26
.21
.44
.17
.25
.33
.50

8
6
7
5

8

..

9
8
8
3

1
1
I

The figures in column IV illustrate the benefit of the group and
Reich list provisions for the small parties. With the exception of
the Bavarian People's party, which obtained almost the maximum
number of seats possible in three South German districts, the seat
percentages from group and Reich lists varied inversely with the
size of the party. The percentages of relatively small parties like
the Nationalists and the Democrats were considerably greater than
those of the two largest parties.
The provisions restricting the number of seats which parties
could gain from the Reich lists to the total which they had received
in the districts affected only the Communists and two other minority
groups. The former received 441,995 votes, but secured the necessary 60,000 only in one district, and hence could not obtain more
than one additional deputy from the Reich list. Without the provisions in question they could have elected seven deputies from
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the latter, thereby increasing to eight their total membership in the
new Reichstag. The Poles and another minority group, the "DeutschWirtschaftsbund fUr Stadt und Land" amassed 76,497 and 88,652
votes, respectively. Since the votes were scattered among several
constituencies, neither possessed the necessary 60,000 in any single
district, and hence could not utilize the vote totals forwarded to
their respective Reich lists.
What might have been the outcome of the balloting in 1920 had
the electoral law for the National Assembly been retained? The
probable differences are suggested by the following table. Figures
in the first column represent the actual results of the election. Those
in the second column have been constructed by applying the
d'Hondt method of seat allocation to the election statistics for each
district.
(Majority) Social Democratic Party
Independent Social Democratic Party
Center Party
German National People's Party
People's Party
German Democratic Party
Bavarian People's Party
Guelph Party
Bavarian Peasant's Union
Communist Party

94
81
59

62

100
85

62
61
55
30

60
36
21

22

5

5

4

3

2

1

The figures in the second column should be regarded as approximate. As illustrated by an analysis of the 1919 election statistics,54
they would have been slightly altered by list combinations among
the various parties. Elections under the 1919 law, furthermore,
would not have offered incentives to minorities comparable to those
of the 1920 system of allocation. Many organizations which presented candidates in the elections might not have done so had they
been confronted by an electoral law which obviously handicapped
small parties. The number of votes wasted on minority parties
perhaps would not have approached three million. Seat totals for
the largest parties therefore might have been greater than those
listed in the second column. The two socialist parties, for example, might have gained more than the ten additional seats
allotted to them in the column. The figures in the latter do not
indicate, however, that members of the coalition government in
the Assembly would have gained a majority of seats in the new
Reichstag had the 1919 electoral law been retained. Although the
Social Democratic and Center parties undoubtedly would have
picked up several seats in the latter event, the gains would have
been offset by the losses of the Democrats. Regardless of the voting
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procedure, the majority coalition was doomed in 1920 by a manifest decline in republican sentiment.
The electoral law of 1920 was a monument to the German approach to politics and parliamentary government. To those who
drafted and passed the law the creation of an election system designed to produce mathematically exact results logically appeared
to follow the triumph of democracy in Germany. That the system
might be incompatible with, or at least endanger the functioning
of, parliamentary government seemed inconceivable. With little
or no experience in the responsibilities of wielding political power,
the members of the National Assembly who passed the law understood neither the dynamics of parliamentary government nor the
role played therein by the election system. As representatives of
small parties they were more interested in guaranteeing the
minority positions of their respective groups than in creating an
electoral law which might foster the emergence of a majority competent to assume responsibility for directing the affairs of government.
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The Implications

HAT are the implications of this study for an assessment
of the ''''eimar heritage? The foregoing chapters have
shown how P. R. gained acceptance during the Second
Reich in relation to industrialization and its attendant effects, how
the one fostered and the other gave expression to fragmentation and
conflict in German society and politics. The concluding chapter
focuses on the views expressed by the proponents of P. R. (treated in
Part I) and their opponents (Part II) on the following questions:
What is the purpose of the suffrage? What should be the role of an
elected parliament in formulating and directing public policy?
Does sovereignity rest with the people? What is the proper relationship between the individual and the state? The views expressed
on these and related questions suggest that the German people
during the Second Reich had no real comprehension of democracy,
that they were little prepared in this respect for the Republic which
they acquired in 1918-1919.

W

I

The proportionalists' view of the parliament and its purpose
was revealed in the oft-quoted words ascribed to Mirabeau: "A
representative body is to the nation what a chart is for the physical
configuration of its soil: in all its parts, and as a whole, the representative body should at all times present a reduced picture of the
people-their opinions, aspirations, and wishes .... "1 The analogy
became for the proportionalists a dogma reiterated with almost
evangelistic fervor. If the parliament did not mirror the wishes
of the people, they claimed, then it was a perversion of justice, an
instrument of oppression used by tyrannical majorities against defenseless minorities.
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Basic to the proportionalists' view of the parliament was their
interpretation of the suffrage. The term in German means literally
the right (das Recht) to elect (wahlen). Das Wahlrecht hence involved, according to the proportionalists, not only the right of the
individual to vote for the candidate of his choice, but also the
right to elect the candidate. "The constitution [of 1871]," stated
one writer, "grants every citizen equal suffrage, i.e., the right to
participate through his act of voting in the formation of the popular
assembly."2 Year after year, however, countless voters witnessed
the defeat of their candidates at the polls. Year after year countless
voters, certain of the impossibility of electing their candidates, abstained from casting their ballots. All were "robbed" of their
suffrage, deprived of their sacred right to participate in the German
Schicksal) the German destiny.3 "Under this system the suffrage
[das Wahhecht] is thus nonexistent. There remains merely a right
to vote [Stimmrecht]) or a mere possibility of electing, no suffrage,
i.e., no right of the voter to demand that his vote shall be not only
counted, but also weighed.... "4
The interpretation was by implication subversive to the traditional exaltation of the state in German political theory and experience. If the suffrage was not a duty performed by the individual
for the state, if it was rather an individual right existing independently in society, then the body created by the exercise of that
right would seem to function independently of any institution like
the state. For what purpose, furthermore, did the individual possess
what was by implication a "natural" right to vote, or in the proportionalist view, to elect? Was the act of voting or electing an end
in itself, devoid of political consequences? Or was it a means by
which each individual could participate through the elected parliament in his government?
Rarely did German proportionalists assert the doctrine of
popular sovereignty. Rarely did they contend that political power
emanated from the people and was exercised by them through an
elected assembly. Only the socialists gave occasional recognition of
the implications of responsible self-government inherent in their
interpretation of the Wah lrech t. "It is a natural and therefore
sacred right of the people to shape its own destiny," wrote one
party theorist in 1877, "and the people is powerful and sovereign
only when it exercises the highest and the ultimate right of decision
in all areas of legislation."5 Since the Reichstag was not a true
reflection of the desires and wishes of the German people, he contended, "large numbers of the population" were "robbed" of their
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franchise. "The sovereignty of the German people" thus became
"illusory," their "right of representation" became "in practice a
deceptive right [Scheinrecht]."6
The stated or implied viewpoint of most advocates of P. R. was
expressed by a middle-class liberal who dedicated his publication
"to the memory of Mirabeau" and established as his motto "equal
rights for all." Asserting a belief in political equality, which he
regarded as "an inheritance of the French Revolution, a fulfillment
of the principle of 'egalitt!,' at least in the political realm," he
concluded:
The essence of the constitutional state consists partially in
the right of all the citizens to participate with the ruler
[dem Herrscher] in working out the destiny [die Geschicke]
of the people.7
The force of tradition was strong. An identification of Herrscher
with people seemed next to impossible for the proportionalists.
Implicit in the claim that each voter had the right to elect the
candidate of his choice, that he was misrepresented in the parliament by any deputy against whom he had voted, was the assumption that he possessed a rigid Weltanschauung. 8 He was, according
to the proportionalists, a person of unyielding political conviction,
one to whom compromise was unnatural and degrading. He and
those of similar conviction with whom he associated in a political
party were sharply separated in the political arena from others
with different Weltanschauungen. Runoff elections to the Reichstag
thus were anathema to the advocates of P. R. The voter who had
been "robbed" of his suffrage through the defeat of his candidate
in the first election was asked by his party to vote in the runoff for
one of the two remaining candidates. "When two friendly parties
which remain separate in the main [first] election for the purpose
of determining the number of their supporters go together in the
second election, it is quite in order, natural, and inoffensive. When
parties, however, which have fought one another violently suddenly make common cause, then it is unnatural and creates psychic
difficulties for leadership and electorate."9 Under P. R., the proportionalists asserted, voters and parties could remain true to their
principles. No longer would "unnatural" coalitions among antagonistic parties cause "psychic difficulties" for party leaders and followers. No longer would the voter be misrepresented in the parliament by a deputy not his very own. "Political purity [Reinlichkeitr
would be assured. 10
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The assumption that political convictions could not and should
not be compromised was not without basis in the experience of
Germans with parties and politics. Unable constitutionally or
otherwise to control the chancellor, denied any real control of the
purse strings, its membership banned from ministerial posts, the
Reichstag during the greater part of the Second Reich was an
institution set apart from the center of decision and action in
Germany. Its membership was deprived of that which customarily
unites parties in programs of constructive action-the necessity for
compromise. The parties in the Reichstag as a consequence were
more negative than positive in approach, more inclined toward
factional struggles than constructive action. Bismarck had contributed further to their incompetence by playing them off against
one another, and by fostering in Reichstag debates an attitude
which attributed to political opponents intentions which were
socially and politically dangerous, if not subversive. Yet the proportionalists' assumption of the impossibility or undesirability of
compromising one's political convictions involved a questionable
identification of politicians with voters. Despite Heine's contention
that every German was his own party,u the attitudes of German
voters probably were much less absolute and unyielding than those
of the deputies whom they returned to the Reichstag. In general,
however, the assumption by proportionalists that German voters
possessed uncompromising convictions appears to have been relatively accurate.
In addition to their theoretical justification of P. R. in terms
of the right to elect the candidate of one's choice, proportionalists
also urged the absolute necessity for including all conflicting points
of view in the elected parliament.1 2 To deny representation, they
declared, to those groups considered dangerous or subversive to the
established order was to court disaster. Their exclusion from peaceful channels of expression would merely drive them into extreme
forms of revolutionary activity. To grant them unrestricted representation in the parliament, however, would open to them peaceful
opportunities for the settlement of their interests. Their participation in the legislative process, it was argued, would foster an awareness of the problems of government, of the difficulty and impracticality of implementing extremist decisions. In short, a moderation
of radical elements in the electorate would result from their free
and unrestricted expression in the parliament.
The middle-class liberals who urged P. R. in this regard as a
bulwark against revolution illustrated the nature of German experi-
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ence with the socialists. Revisionist rather than revolutionary
tendencies had been strengthened by the growth of Social Democratic power in Germany. Suspicion and hostility among socialist
and left-liberal groups gradually had diminished as each began in
the Landtage and in the Reichstag to cooperate with the other in
working toward common political ends. Middle-class liberals were
not slow to recognize the advantages of yielding to Social Democratic demands for increased representation in the Reichstag through
P. R., not only with regard to strengthening socialist tendencies
toward moderation,13 but also for the purpose of increasing leftliberal power through possible coalition with the socialists. 14
Would not the expression of conflicting points of view in the
parliament break down existing party structures? From Switzerland,
the classic land of experimentation with P. R., came accounts of
party splintering in cantons where proportional voting was introduced,15 A report by the Swiss Bundesrat issued in 1910, for example, concluded that proportional representation in that country
had "contributed to the crumbling of the old historic parties and
in general of all large political groupS."16 Even the slight experience of legislative assemblies in Germay with P. R. produced complaints of party splintering. In Hamburg, for example, almost a
dozen groups arose in 1906 in the first elections to the second chamber held under the system,17 Although the number soon decreased,
complaints persisted that the use of P. R., in the words of one critic,
"gives way to a purely class representation. The economic, confessional, and other special interests supplant in importance those
which are political."18
The proponents countered the evidence of party splintering with
assertions that P. R. merely afforded expression to divisions already
existing within parties,19 Such divisions occurred regardless of the
election system; nothing could prevent their continuation. Discordant elements, they contended, were forced into unhappy unions
by a system of election like the majority system which denied representation to minorities. Personal animosities and ideological conflicts within parties were subordinated to the harsh necessity for
individual survival through collective endeavor. Elimination at
the polls would result if unity were not maintained. As interpreted
by its friends, P. R., merely relieved the necessity for unhappy and
unproductive unions among discordant political groups. Each was
assured of representation in the parliament, there to express its
own unadulterated Weltanschauung. Far from splintering the
party structure, P. R. in the view of its advocates merely afforded
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expression to the diversity of political conviction already existing
within Germany.
Did not the greatest possible reflection of existing social and
political diversity in the parliament constitute a danger to the
latter's workability? The proportionalists who bothered to consider
the question were in almost complete accord. To conclude that an
increase of parties and groups within the parliament decreased its
ability to function efficiently was to commit an error of logic.
" ... The more complete and the more genuine the representation of
groupings among people in the parliament," one writer asserted,
"the sooner will occur within the latter a reconciliation of opposing forces in harmony with the true interest of the total organism
[des Gesamtkorpers]."20
Proportionalists were at their strongest in contending that
Germany never had used P. R., yet traditionally had possessed a
multiplicity of parties. How could the charge of party splintering
be levelled, they demanded, when a score of parties had arisen in
Germany under the majority system? As expressed in 1885 by one
of the earliest proportionalists in Germany,
The majority principle has not prevented the formation of
a large papal [ultramontanen] party united only by a common
religious point of view. It has not denied representation to
a fourth estate [the workers] which subordinates all questions
of national and religious nature to the socio-economic interest. It has not prevented the shattering of a large party
on a political-commercial question like that of free trade
versus protective tariff, not to mention the representation of
Poles, Alsatians, Guelphs, and other particular interests. 21
The same point of view was expressed by Hugo Preuss in 1919 to
the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly. "Never
have we had proportional elections to the Reichstag in Germany,"
he asserted, "and yet our parties always have been as numerous as
the sands of the sea .... "22 To anticipate a reduction in the number of parties, to hope for an evolution of the two-party system on
the English model hence ignored, according to the proportionalists,
the traditional cleavages of political conviction in Germany. The
country long had possessed almost half a dozen major parties, not to
mention the numerous splinter groups. She undoubtedly would
continue to possess as many, not in consequence of the election
system, but in response to the "deep-seated differences in political
attitude indigenous to the German people."23
The presence of political diversity was for some proportionalists
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the natural outcome of industrialization. Everywhere that he chose
to look, Dr. Ernst Cahn, the foremost champion of P. R. in Germany prior to the war, professed to see the emergence of multiparty systems. The two-party system, he pointed out, had disappeared in Belgium with the rise of the Social Democrats, and appeared to be in the process of doing so in England with the growth
of an independent workers' party. Even in the United States, he
contended, the workers' movement might well "put an end" to the
two-party system. Industrialization thus had mixed new ingredients
in the traditional political conflict of liberals and conservatives .
. . . To the opposition present in all countries between the
more conservative and the more liberal point of view is added
in all countries with highly-developed industry the opposition between employers and workers, between the haves and
have-nots, one eventually expressed politically through the
formation of an independent workers' party.24
It followed for Dr. Cahn that the two-party system was completely
unsuited to Germany. The workers' movement, not to mention the
growth of individualism, the increasing "intellectual differentiations" so characteristic of modern society, had rendered even more
diverse than before a society traditionally lacking in "confessional"
and "national" unity. "The victory of the two-party system here
[in Germany]," he concluded, "is prohibited by the constant action
of these factors. That proportional representation retards or makes
difficult the emergence [of the two-party system] is therefore out of
the question."25
That two-party systems were fading out in modern society
seemed quite logical to proportionalists like Dr. Cahn impressed
with the impact of economic change upon political parties and
attitudes, and also by the phenomenal growth of Social Democracy
in Germany. The conclusion, however, showed slight comprehension of the role of political parties in democratic societies. Dr.
Cahn and other proportionalists wrote very glibly about multiple
and two-party systems in other countries, but failed to recognize
the effects in democracies of that which was for the most part denied
political parties in Germany: responsibility for the direction of
public policy. That there existed pressures in democratic systems
of government toward the formation of large political units capable
of acquiring and maintaining political power was a concept for the
most part alien to the thinking and experience of German proportionalists.26
Nowhere was the almost exclusive concern of proportionalists
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with the cOmpOSItIOn of the parliament better illustrated than in
the writings of jurists and mathematicians. The latter were challenged by the task of constructing the most perfect system of P. R.,
the one which would mirror the electorate with the highest degree
of accuracy. They were stimulated to the creation of systems of almost unbelievable compexity, systems which abounded in mathematical symbols and algebraic equations. Had the unsuspecting German voter chanced to peruse one of their creations, he might have
been impressed to find himself part of an elaborate equation, to discover that he had been divided, subtracted, then multiplied into a
position of considerable importance. Had he sought to comprehend the subtleties of his relationship with other elements of the
equation, he might have been saddened by his ignorance. The
experts were profound to the point of incomprehensibility. One
editor of a socialist publication at least had the courtesy to warn
his readers that the "complicated computations" contained in one
section of an article on proportional representation could be "easily
understood only by those trained in mathematics."27
So enamored did some theorists become with the intricacies of
P. R. that occasionally they forsook political realities altogether.
In the words of one professor and jurist, Adolf Tecklenburg, the
system was an "electoral technique" entirely divorced from politics.
"Proportional representation," he asserted in one of his numerous
publications, "has no practical shortcomings, especially none in the
political sense. The latter would be quite impossible, since proportional representation essentially is an electoral technique concerned solely with the procedure of electing. Whether elections are
majority or proportional has nothing to do with the realization
of specific political objectives. The principal problem is to find a
suitable proportional election system, and one can always be
found." The justification of P. R., he concluded, lay solely in the
realm of "pure thought," and especially in that of mathematics. 28
Such utterances must be quoted without comment. Ridiculous
though they appear to the American, they were seriously intended
by Dr. Tecklenburg. That they were received so matter-of-factly,
that they found such congenial company among similar assertions
by the growing number of proportionalists illustrates the average
German's inexperience with government and politics during the
Second Reich. Split into hostile and warring factions by deepseated social and political antagonisms, the Germans were more concerned than Englishmen or Americans with the problem of minority
representation. Little accustomed to participation in the affairs
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of government, they tended, as reflected in the views of the proportionalists, to regard representation as an end in itself, to exclude
consideration of the influence of election systems on the capacity of
the parliament to govern. The tendency was manifest in the assertions of Hugo Preuss, the principal architect of the Weimar Constitution, who declared in 1919 to the Constitutional Committee of
the National Assembly that the suffrage was "only in a restricted
sense," a question of parties and politics, that it was "essentially a
question of technique," one of securing the "best system of proportional representation."21)
II

The opponents were devastating in their analysis of P. R. Was
it technically possible, they inquired, to "mirror" the electorate,
to reflect accurately in the parliament all shades of opinion in their
exact proportions among the voters? Was not the attempt futile,
indeed ludicrous in view of changes of opinion common amolIg
voters after the election? Would not new elections then become
necessary at frequent intervals, perhaps every month, perhaps
every week? Was not the proportionalists' interpretation of the
Wahlrecht in the last analysis untenable and unsound, divorced
from reality and dangerous in practice?
Territorial districts, the opponents claimed, distorted the parliamentary "image" of the electorate allegedly reflected by P. R.
When districts were retained, as they were in Germany where proportional systems were adopted, the number of votes required for
election varied from district to district. Ten thousand votes might
elect a deputy in one district; twenty thousand might suffice in another. Votes in the latter thus would have one-half the weight
possessed by those in the former. It was thus impossible, according
to the opponents, to speak of an equality among votes under such
circumstances. Even the most exact systems of allucation, moreover, left a remainder of unused votes. Some candidates received
more votes than required for election; others failed to achieve the
necessary number. Vote fractions remained in either case. Unfortunately for the proportionalists, "deputies could not be divided
into fractions."3o
As viewed by the opponents, the ideal of equality among votes
posed a dilemma for the proportionalists. The latter sought the
highest possible degree of equality through numerous technical devices. In proportion as their systems achieved success in this respect,
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however, the less comprehensible, the less practicable they became.
As put by one opponent,
The "more numerically just," the more impracticable, and
the more practicable the less "numerically just." One may
twist and turn as he wishes; the dilemma remains. 31
How did the proportionalists seek to resolve their dilemma? Most
favored systems which in effect sacrified equality to workability.
Those like Dr. Tecklenburg who pursued the ideal of equality ad
absurdum were so far removed from political realities as to be unaware of the dilemma.
The most damaging argument against P. R. concerned, not the
relation of one vote to another, but the attitude of the person who
cast the vote. He was, according to the proportionalists, one who
knew his convictions and strictly adhered to them. The difficulties
inherent in this assumption were suggested, though not clearly
enunciated by the opponents. "Were it actually necessary [to mirror
the views of the electorate]," one writer asserted, "then we should
have to reelect the parliament every month, perhaps every week .
. . ."32 If the position of a party shifted on some issue even one
week after "photographing, i.e., the election," another pointed out,
consistency with the requisite of equality would require the electorate to be "photographed anew."33 Even the proportionalists
were known to admit that the voter had not one, but several points
of view. As lamented by one writer, the individual voter shared the
viewpoints of many unrelated groups in society. At the polls he
must make the choice: " ... agrarian or progressive, industrial or
Catholic, ... as an interested party in a railway line or as a Malthusian. He can do no more than this."34
Were there not individuals, moreover, who failed to make the
choice, who did not or could not vote? Many persons in Germanysoldiers, sailors, women, children, the mentally unbalanced, and
those in bankruptcy-were disenfranchised by law. Thousands more
excluded themselves by abstention from the polls. Those who
actually voted thus comprised only a small fraction of the total
population. The "will of the people" as expressed through elections hence became the will of a small minority, one which might
correspond only vaguely or perhaps not at all to the popular will. A
parliament so constituted would be a "caricature [Zerrbild]," not
a true "reflected image [Spiegelbild]" of the popular will. 35
If P. R., and by implication all other electoral techniques, could
not afford adequate expression to an elusive popular will, if representation as interpreted by the proportionalists were, then, an
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anachronism in modern society, what was the purpose of the
suffrage? Most emphatically, according to the opponents, it was
not a "right to elect," a right to place in the parliament the delegate
of one's choice. To assume the existence of this or any other individual right contradicted the essence of the state as something to
which particular wills were subordinated.36 Granted by the state
to the individual, the suffrage became for most opponents of P. R.
a "public function" regulated in the words of one writer by the
"maxim without which a state could not exist: first order, then
freedom."37
The suffrage became in this view relative to the interests of the
state. The individual possessed no inherent right of representation in an elected parliament. Duties, not rights, were his to perform in service of the state. The suffrage was to serve, never to
oppose the raison d'etat, and hence could vary with time and place.
It was scarcely possible, concluded one writer, "to formulate an
ideal suffrage valid at all times, and for all peoples and states. The
most suitable suffrage is a relative consideration, one which varies
with differences in time, race, economic condition, and political
situation."38
The interpretation, so common in Germany during the Second
Reich, enabled political theorists to combine seemingly irreconcilable points of view. An editor of the scholarly Zeitschrift fur
Politik, Dr. Adolf Grabowsky, supposedly a liberal, could assert in
one breath the validity of universal and equal suffrage for the Reich
and the three-class system of voting for Prussia.39 "Weare living in
a world of relativity," he explained, "which even the hallowed
suffrage cannot transcend. What is right for Germany is not at all
reasonable for Prussia." Why was universal and equal suffrage
suited to Germany? Because "it was the most powerful argument
for the South Germans to join the North German Confederation
and hence contributed to the unification of Germany." What if it
ceased to serve the fatherland? "If this suffrage were to place in
jeopardy, rather than assure the stability of, the Reich, then it
would become untenable and the time for its abolition would have
arrived." Why was universal and equal suffrage unsuited to Prussia? Because it would undermine the existing order.40 More than
eighty-five per cent of the voters in Prussia cast their ballots with
the third class. Equal suffrage would reduce the dominant elements, the first and second classes, to impotence; it would undermine the "historic position" of the Prussian monarchy and hence
jeopardize "Prussia's calling in world history."
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In the Prussian monarchy [Dr. Grabowsky stated] the abstract
concept of the state has become as though alive. The relation
of the citizen to the state here is no longer impartial, but personal. ... In the common interest everybody keeps his place,
because he knows that the common trust will be returned to
him a hundredfold. And if the reason of state [Staatsraison]
-i.e., not a vague theory, much more a bloody necessity-so
demands, then the individual steps quietly aside. However
one stands with regard to this system, through which the Prus·
sian state has become mighty-its completeness and grandeur
[Grossartigkeit] one must acknowledge."41
The abdication of individual political and moral responsibility to
the state could be no more complete than this.
H the suffrage were relative to the raison d' hat) then it followed
for many opponents of P. R. that deputies represented the common
interest in parliament. As stated in the federal constitution (Article
29), they were not bound by instructions from the voters. "Deputies represent a fixed political viewpoint, to be sure, and are
generally elected for that reason. In the exercise of their parliamentary duties, however, they act with complete independence.
They are representatives, not of their constituents, but of the entire
people [des gesamten Volkes]. They are to express in the parliament,
not the views of their voters, but their own views, and therefore are
not bound by orders and instructions."42 It followed for the opponents of P. R. that most exact representation in parliament of
all points of view within the electorate was of little or no consequence. Since deputies were guided in the performance of their
parliamentary duties by that which they believed to be in the best
interests of the nation, the purpose of the suffrage should be to
select "the most intelligent, the most honorable, and the most competent among the people."43 Not only might individuals with such
qualifications serve the common interest to a greater degree than
those who were stupid, dishonorable, and incompetent. They also
could be expected to preserve an identification of the so-called common interest with that of the dominant social and political groups
which they represented.
What was the role of the parliament as interpreted by those who
regarded the suffrage as a "public function"? Just as the privilege
of voting was granted by the state to the individual, so the parliament owed its existence to the state's magnanimity. It was an
mstitution set apart from the state. 44 Like the individual who
exercised the suffrage, the parliament could act only in harmony
with the interests of the state. It was an institution which com-
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plemented, never contradicted, the actions of that which epitomized
the common good. If it failed to do so, if particular interests gained
the ascendancy to oppose the state, then it no longer expressed the
common will and should be dissolved. Parliaments might err; the
state, never. Participation in the formulation and direction of
public policy was thus restricted to the ruling few; opposition to the
established order became subversion.
Not all opponents of P. R. upheld so completely the conservative
viewpoint in Germany. Several attacked proportional voting, not
as subversive to existing power relationships in Germany, but as
detrimental to the proper functioning of the parliament. Insofar
as they invested the latter with responsibility for governing and implied or attributed sovereign power to the people, they might be
described as democratic. Their democracy, however, showed the
effects of the German experience with government and politics.
Parties, political power, and public opinion were viewed mostly in
the abstract. Comprehension of democratic practices and procedures
was almost negligible.
As viewed by one writer, proportional representation would
give rise to small cliques and interest groups in the parliament and
further existing political divisions within the population. The results would be highly detrimental to the conduct of government.
The practical politician ... viewing a new increase in minority strength [he stated] will take into consideration the difficulties arising in every constitutional government from the absence of a compact majority upon which it can rely. And
many will hesitate to strengthen the minorities which negate
in principle the national, political, or economic bases of the
existing political and social order.45
The government in a "constitutional" system plainly was dependent
in the writer's view upon a majority in the parliament. The people
by implication were sovereign. The German experience with
government and politics appeared in the writer's reference to
minorities opposed "in principle" to the existing order. They and
the order which they opposed apparently were regarded by him as
static, as founded upon rigid and unalterable principles, each of
which involved the negation of the other. It would seem to follow
from the writer's view that minorities never could constitute in
the parliament a "loyal" opposition like that in the British House
of Commons. Never could they cooperate in constructive legislation
with the party or parties in power. The existing social and political
order upheld by the latter was by implication antithetical to their
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cherished principles. How could they support that which they
sought to abolish?
The editors of the scholarly journal Annalen des Deutschen
Reichs published in 1899 an attack on P. R. which asserted the
necessity for decision in parliamentary government.
Wherever parliamentarianism exists, especially in an indirect democracy [they stated], wherever the parliament thus
determines the direction [den Gang] of government, wherever
it possesses political power, there the necessity, if at all possible, for a strong, prevailing parliamentary majority becomes
all-important. The system of representation assumes definite
significance at this point, for it may give rise to strong majorities. Minority groups will not be handicapped to any
great extent in the latter event, since it matters little
whether they are subordinated in the election or in the
parliament, quite apart from the fact that they can find a
measure of expreSSIOn through the representative system.
An old French saying (Naville) runs: "La majorite est Ie
principe de la decision, la proportionalite est Ie principe
de la representation." That would sound fine were it not that
parliamentarianism is a matter solely of decision, i.e., the
will of the majority, and not of representation, i.e., the interests of the minority.46
A majority clearly was regarded as essential to a parliament which
wielded sovereign power. To emphasize "representation" destroyed
the majority and hence the capacity of the parliament for decision.
Minorities were excluded by the writers from participation in the
affairs of government. Whether they were suppressed within or
outside the parliament was immaterial. They were to be prohibited at all costs from disrupting the parliament by weakening
the majority. Could they not one day acquire a majority in the
parliament? Could the present majority not lose the confidence of
the people and become itself a minority? The writers' silence on
such matters, their strict compartmentalization of the majority and
the minority, illustrated the limitations of their view of political
parties in relation to public opinion. They seemed unaware that
parties rose or fell in power in a democracy as they gained or lost
the confidence of the electorate, that they provided the public a
means with which to assess responsibility for governmental actions.
Among the opponents of P. R. in Germany, the Progressive
leader and later chairman of the Democratic party, Friedrich Naumann, appeared to be alone in comprehending the role of political
parties in a democracy. To a liberal party convention held in 1906
in Berlin he asserted:
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Precisely that which causes the splintering, the paralyzation of effort among us will be advanced by proportional
representation. The important thing is not that everybody
possesses the opportunity to have his point of view expressed
1D the parliament, but that there be a body actually competent to govern, so that the word "parliament" acquires a
political meaning. And that assumes that party splintering
will be a thing of the past, that we will be able to say: here
is the Right; here is the Leftl And not until we have right
and left can we make public policy [Politik machenJ as in
England, where those who have been in the oppositlon for
fifteen years must then assume the responsibility for carrying
out that which they have been talking about. Sheer opposition without responsibility-that is the background of proportional representation. 47
Contrary to the opinion which seemed to prevail in Germany,
parties were not ends in themselves, not rallying points for particularistic points of view to be aired in the parliament. As
interpreted by Naumann, they were organs with which to implement democratic government in modern society, competent to
direct public policy through the parliament so long as they retained the confidence of a majority of the voters. When in the
minority, they sought to convince the electorate by word and deed
that their ideas and members were more competent to serve the
common interest than those of the majority. They were, as Naumann stated in his book, Demokratie und Kaisertum, "necessary
intermediaries [Zwischenkorper] between the electorate and the
majority capable of governing to which they aspire.... The essence
[das Wesen] of the party is the existence of an organization of
voters for the purpose of winning the majority."48
Naumann was almost alone in the National Assembly in 1919
in asserting the necessity for a parliamentary majority. His attempts in the Constitutional Committee to defeat proportional
representation as an instrument promoting party multiplicity and
disunity were beaten down by the powerful polemic of his fellow
Democrat, Hugo Preuss. In a letter written to another party
comrade in May, 1919, Naumann expressed what he termed "far~
reaching pessimism" over the prospects of the new Republic. A
"peaceful solution" to the "majority problem," to the problem of
creating a parliamentary majority essential to stable government,
appeared highly unlikely. The new constitution would leave
Germany leaderless and divided. "I fear," he prophesied, "that
we are creating a situation which can be resolved later only by a
coup d' etat."49

104

/

Prelude to Democracy

The views of those who advocated or rejected P. R. during the
Second Reich suggested additional reasons for pessimism regarding
the outlook for the new Republic. Popular sovereignty was a concept for the most part alien to the proportionalists, subversive to
their opponents. Responsible self-government appeared strikingly
un-German, an end sought chiefly by the socialist Reichsfeinde,
the socialist "enemies of the state." Political parties were viewed
by most writers on P. R., not as means for directing public policy
and assessing responsibility, but as ends in themselves, as groups of
like-minded individuals dedicated to the preservation of particular
Weltanschauungen. Representation became an ideal of reflecting
minority opinions among the voters in the elected parliament, an
ideal expressed ad absurdum in the electoral law of the Weimar
Republic.
As illustrated by the uses which competing groups made or
attempted to make of P. R., neither had the Germans practiced
democracy in their social relations. Industrialists and agrarians
proposed the system with numerous refinements and in combination
with other techniques like occupational representation as a means
of denying full expression in the elected parliament to the rising
socialist movement. Political parties representing middle-class and
agrarian groups in municipal councils, state legislatures, and the
Reichstag extended the system to urban districts where voting
strengths of socialists were concentrated. To undermine the latter's
domination of the workers' movement in Germany, Reichstag
parties introduced P. R. for elections to the numerous boards and
other bodies which had arisen with social and factory legislation.
The paradox of the system of representation supposedly the most
just, and hence the most democratic, yet exalted by its theorists
into an ideal incompatible with the functioning of democratic
institutions of government, was made complete by the undemocratic
ends for which it was employed in Germany.
Democracy was not precluded in Germany by a heritage of
social fragmentation and authoritarianism. Yet the Germans in
1918-1919 appeared strikingly ill-prepared and ill-equipped for
democratic government. In 1919 Walter Rathenau wrote:
We have a Republic; nobody seriously desired it. In the
eleventh hour we acquired parliamentary government; nobody wanted it.50
He might have added that very few Germans appeared capable of
utilizing either one. 51
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